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ANTI-SANCTUARY AND IMMIGRATION LOCALISM 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram,* Rick Su ** & Rose Cuison Villazor *** 
A new front in the war against sanctuary cities has emerged. Until 
recently, the fight against sanctuary cities has largely focused on the 
federal government’s efforts to defund states like California and cities 
like Chicago and New York for resisting federal immigration enforcement. 
Thus far, localities have mainly prevailed against this federal anti-
sanctuary campaign, relying on federalism protections afforded by the 
Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering and anticoercion doctrines. 
Recently, however, the battle lines have shifted with the proliferation of 
state-level laws that similarly seek to punish sanctuary cities. States 
across the country are directly mandating local participation, and 
courts thus far have upheld those state policies. These laws, like Texas’s 
S.B. 4, prohibit local sanctuary policies and impose severe punishments 
on the cities and officials that support them. This new state-versus-local 
terrain has doctrinal, political, and normative implications for the 
future of local government resistance to immigration enforcement. These 
implications have thus far been undertheorized in immigration-law 
scholarship. This Essay seeks to change that. 
This Essay is the first to focus on this emerging wave of state anti-
sanctuary laws. In so doing, it makes three contributions. First, 
descriptively, the Essay documents the upsurge of anti-sanctuary laws 
that have appeared across the United States and explains how they 
differ from prior anti-sanctuary laws. Second, doctrinally, it argues that 
the passage of these laws nudges sanctuary cities to uncharted legal 
territory in immigration law—localism. Under conventional localism 
principles, state anti-sanctuary laws are in a position to more fully 
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quash local sanctuary policies and effectively conscript local officials 
into federal immigration enforcement. However, the draconian structure 
of state anti-sanctuary laws provides a unique context in which to 
advance what we call “immigration localism” claims and protect three 
distinct interests that concern local governments: structural integrity, 
accountability, and local democracy. Third, normatively, this Essay 
contends that immigration localism provides a more accurate descriptive 
and theoretical account of how current immigration enforcement operates 
and promotes community engagement with immigration enforcement. 
Specifically, the reorientation toward localism accounts for the powerful 
role that cities play in immigration enforcement and decenters the federal 
government’s dominant role in that enforcement. To be sure, this Essay 
recognizes that casting a theoretical gaze toward local discretion may end 
up emboldening the most exclusionary impulses of localities and 
supporting local anti-sanctuary policies. In the long run, however, local 
discretion in immigration enforcement is likely to better serve the interests 
of noncitizens and citizens alike. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although she was elected on the same day as Donald Trump, Travis 
County Sheriff Sally Hernandez had a decidedly different take on the 
appropriate role of local law enforcement in matters of immigration. 
Sheriff Hernandez won county office in Texas promising to reduce her 
county’s cooperation with immigration enforcement authorities, stating 
that “[o]ur community is safer when people can report crimes without 
fear of deportation.”1 In staking that position, Hernandez added Travis 
County to the number of sanctuary jurisdictions singled out by President 
Trump and then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions.2 The President and his 
Attorney General, along with other key members of their political party, 
vowed to punish those jurisdictions, pressuring them with loss of funds 
and other sanctions.3 Indeed, soon after Hernandez took office, Greg 
Abbott, the Republican governor of Texas, threatened to pull state 
funding from Travis County unless the Sheriff changed her stance on 
assisting federal immigration agents.4 A few months later, Governor Abbot 
enthusiastically signed Texas S.B. 4, the state’s anti-sanctuary law.5 The 
law limits endorsement of sanctuary policies, cuts down on the discretion 
of local agencies to disentangle themselves from federal enforcement, 
and creates civil and criminal liability for officials who maintain certain 
types of noncooperation policies on aiding federal immigration 
enforcement.6 
Texas is not the only state to have passed such a law. Since 2015, six 
other states—Alabama,7 Indiana,8 Iowa,9 Mississippi,10 North Carolina,11 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Press Release, Travis Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Statement from Sheriff Sally Hernandez 
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.tcsheriff.org/about/press-releases/2017/411-statement-from-
sheriff-sally-hernandez [https://perma.cc/9C23-5V9H]. 
 2. Julián Aguilar, Travis County Sheriff Announces New “Sanctuary” Policy, Tex. 
Trib. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/20/travis-county-sheriff-
announces-new-sanctuary-poli/ [https://perma.cc/Z48X-L765]. 
 3. Martin Kaste, Trump Threatens ‘Sanctuary’ Cities with Loss of Federal Funds, 
NPR (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/26/511899896/ 
trumps-threatens-sanctuary-cities-with-loss-of-federal-funds [https://perma.cc/5T85-5CND]; 
Sedria Renee, Texas Gov. Abbot Halts Travis County Funding over Sanctuary Policy, NBC News 
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/texas-gov-abbot-halts-travis-county-
funding-over-sanctuary-policy-n716201 [https://perma.cc/5PGT-RC86]. 
 4. Renee, supra note 3. 
 5. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1) 
(2017)). 
 6. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1)–(3). 
 7. See Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (2018). 
 8. See Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2 (2018). 
 9. See S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codified at Iowa 
Code § 825.1). 
 10. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-1-119 (2018). 
 11. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 153A-145.5, 160A-205.2 (2018). A more expansive anti-
sanctuary measure, S.B. 145, passed the North Carolina Senate in 2017 but failed in the 
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and Tennessee12—have passed similar ones. And at least seventeen states 
have introduced or passed like-minded bills.13 This turn toward state anti-
sanctuary legislation marks a momentous shift in the debate over 
sanctuary cities, for they represent the most significant threat yet to 
conscript local officials and agencies into the federal immigration 
enforcement regime. 
Consider Texas’s S.B. 4. Referred to as a “show me your papers” 
law,14 S.B. 4 was challenged by the City of El Cenizo, which argued that 
the law—which prohibits local governments from adopting sanctuary 
policies—is preempted by federal immigration law and is unconstitu-
tionally vague.15 Although the district court in City of El Cenizo v. Texas 
agreed with the city’s preemption arguments and issued a preliminary 
injunction,16 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 
much of the lower court’s decision, ruling that federal immigration laws 
do not preempt a state’s authority to compel its localities to comply with 
the federal government.17 Instead, the court noted that S.B. 4 merely 
does on a state level what local governments within the state have done—
regulate whether to cooperate with the federal government.18 The Fifth 
Circuit’s decision simultaneously demonstrates the court’s recognition of 
local decisionmaking in immigration law and the power of the state to 
compel local governments to comply with federal immigration authorities. 
Despite this significant swing toward state preemption, little attention 
has been paid thus far to this development in immigration law scholarship,19 
                                                                                                                           
House. See S.B. 145, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). The bill number was later 
reused for an entirely different issue. See Senate Bill 145/SL 2018-74, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 
https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookup/2017/SB%20145 [https://perma.cc/W43C-D75Z] (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
 12. See H.B. 2315, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018). 
 13. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 7282.5 (2018); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 805/5 (West 
2019); S.B. 18-220, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018); H.B. 9, 2018 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); H.B. 105, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018); H.B. 205, 
30th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2017); S.B. 14, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); 
H.B. 501, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017); H.P. 272, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Me. 2017); H.B. 4105, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017); H.B. 611, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mont. 2017); S.O. 3698, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 179, 132d Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); S.B. 10, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); H.B. 
1985, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); S.B. 275, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2017); 
S.B. 1378, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016). 
 14. See Manny Fernandez, Texas Banned ‘Sanctuary Cities.’ Some Police Departments 
Didn’t Get the Memo., N.Y. Times (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
03/15/us/texas-sanctuary-sb4-immigration.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 15. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 760–75 (W.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d 
in part and vacated in part, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 16. See id. at 812–13. 
 17. See City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 180. 
 18. See id. at 178 (stating that “[i]n its operation, S.B. 4 is similar to one of the city 
[sanctuary] ordinances some plaintiff[] [cities] have themselves adopted”). 
 19. To be sure, immigration law scholars have analyzed the roles that state and local 
governments doctrinally and normatively play in the regulation and enforcement of 
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and only recently has the local-government literature begun to address the 
issue.20 Instead, legal scholarship has been primarily consumed with the 
constitutionality of so-called “sanctuary cities.”21 These jurisdictions, all of 
which maintain policies that limit local cooperation and communication 
with federal immigration authorities to differing degrees,22 became the 
centerpiece of then-candidate Donald Trump’s campaign23 and have 
remained a central obsession of President Trump.24 Accordingly, much 
popular and scholarly energy has been devoted to the legality of federal 
crackdowns on these noncooperating jurisdictions and agencies.25 
                                                                                                                           
immigration law. See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority 
Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 
31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 965, 970–71, 975–76 (2004); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance 
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 581–90 (2008); Rick Su, A 
Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulation, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1619 (2008) 
[hereinafter Su, Localist]. To date, however, this Essay is the only to examine state anti-
sanctuary laws and their implications for immigration law. 
 20. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1995, 2005 (2018) [hereinafter Briffault, New Preemption]; Erin Adele Scharff, 
Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State–Local Relationship?, 106 Geo. L.J. 1469, 
1506–07 (2018). Our examination of state anti-sanctuary laws differs from these articles in 
significant ways in that we consider, among other things, how state anti-sanctuary laws are 
impacting the legal arguments that cities could bring against states and whether, as a 
normative matter, the trend toward localism in immigration law should itself be supported. 
 21. See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. 
L. Rev. 1703, 1741–43 (2018) (discussing the “constitutional safeguards for administrative 
arrest warrants” in the immigration context); David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 583, 645 (2017) (noting 
that “the anti-commandeering principle and related state sovereignty rationales play 
leading roles in the scholarship defending subfederal sanctuary policies”). 
 22. See Lasch et. al., supra note 21, at 1705. 
 23. Donald Trump, Presidential Campaign Speech at Rally in Phoenix, Arizona (Aug. 
31, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-
transcript-20160831-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/599N-JQ2D]. 
 24. In 2018, the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the state of California 
contending that its status as a sanctuary state violates congressional mandates. See 
Complaint at 2, United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018) 
(No. 18-254), 2018 WL 1181625 [hereinafter California Complaint]. 
 25. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Federalism Friction in the First Year of the Trump 
Presidency, 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 401, 402–15 (2018) (assessing the federalism 
implications of the federal government’s targeting of sanctuary jurisdictions and 
subsequent lower court decisions); Christine Kwon & Marissa Roy, Local Action, National 
Impact: Standing Up for Sanctuary Cities, 127 Yale L.J. Forum 715, 715–17 (2018), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/KwonRoy_mtozyv98.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXG4-49HR] 
(advocating for dissenting cities against the federal government’s crackdown on sanctuary 
jurisdictions, specifically San Francisco, California). Two of the authors of this Essay have 
recently written an article examining sanctuary cities, but as part of a broader network of 
private and public actions. See Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary 
Networks, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1209 (2018) [hereinafter Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary 
Networks] (discussing potential partnerships between public and private entities to provide 
sanctuary to undocumented immigrants). 
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As it turns out, however, federal attempts to shut down sanctuary 
cities have largely been ineffective, as they have either lacked 
congressional support or been rejected by federal and state courts.26 In 
litigation, cities and counties have successfully defeated federal attempts 
to commandeer and coerce their participation.27 By contrast, as the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision to uphold Texas’s S.B. 4 indicates, cities might not fare 
as well when challenging state anti-sanctuary laws. The proliferation of 
state anti-sanctuary laws and bills that seek to prohibit and penalize local 
dissent from immigration law suggests that, at minimum, more litigation 
between cities and states is likely to ensue. More broadly, the upsurge in 
these state laws points to the need to explore in depth the doctrinal, 
normative, and theoretical implications of this new development for 
immigration enforcement and the future of sanctuary cities. 
This Essay is the first to focus on this new wave of state anti-sanctuary 
efforts and, in doing so, provides fresh legal avenues for advocates to 
engage in challenging state preemption of local sanctuary laws. At the 
outset, it argues that the passage of these laws nudges sanctuary cities 
away from federalism principles and toward a new legal landscape—what 
we term “immigration localism.”28 This legal framework, which focuses 
on the relationship between states and localities,29 is uncharted legal 
territory for immigration law in general and sanctuary cities in particular, 
which have mostly relied on federalism’s anticommandeering and 
anticoercion principles.30 Within the state–local dynamic, however, cities 
have traditionally been considered creatures of the state31 and thus 
viewed as having limited local powers and as being susceptible to state 
preemption and commandeering.32 
                                                                                                                           
 26. See infra Part I. 
 27. See infra Part I. 
 28. One of us began using the term “immigration localism” more than ten years ago, 
and this Essay builds on some of the concepts argued then. See Su, Localist, supra note 19, 
at 1683 (using the term “immigration localism” and stating that it is “too early to predict 
what a localist approach to immigration will offer,” but “whatever immigration localism is 
or comes to be, it is certainly an approach worth exploring”). 
 29. See id. at 1628–29 (describing the localist framework as a “legal, political and 
ideological structure that organizes the institution of local governments under the state 
level”); see also Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal 
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1307–17 (1994) (discussing 
the convergence of federalism and localism) [hereinafter Briffault, What About the 
‘Ism’?]; Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Federalism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an 
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 960–64 (2007) (discussing the relationship 
between federal and local governments through “cooperative localism”). 
 30. See infra section I.A. 
 31. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939) (referring to municipalities as 
“creatures of the state” that have no standing against “the will of their creator”). 
 32. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part I]; Briffault, 
What About the ‘Ism’?, supra note 29, at 1309; Scharff, supra note 20, at 1507. 
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However, as this Essay points out, closer examination of localism 
demonstrates that state anti-sanctuary laws are not as ominous for the 
future of sanctuary cities as conventional thinking might suggest. 
Specifically, we contend that localism itself contains powerful doctrinal 
and normative arguments grounded in local autonomy that sanctuary 
cities could use to challenge state anti-sanctuary laws.33 These previously 
unexplored localist arguments are significant for immigration law because 
they challenge the conventional descriptive and doctrinal view that the 
federal government dominates immigration regulation. Crucially, these 
arguments, grounded in localist principles, suggest that cities can and 
should have greater roles in immigration enforcement alongside federal 
and state governments. 
The Essay proceeds in three parts. First, Part I provides a descriptive 
account of the rise in both federal and state anti-sanctuary laws, categorizing 
the ways in which they have evolved from previous immigration enforce-
ment laws and how those past efforts differ from federal and state anti-
sanctuary efforts today. 
Next, Part II examines the new immigration localism landscape in 
which sanctuary cities must defend their policies. Despite the presumption 
in favor of state preemption, this Part argues that localism offers not only 
a new legal avenue for cities and other localities to push back against 
state anti-sanctuary laws but also a novel perspective for thinking about 
local sanctuary policies and anti-sanctuary efforts more generally. 
Lastly, Part III turns to the normative case for immigration localism. 
Localism as an analytical lens allows for a better accounting of the way 
that current immigration enforcement actually operates. This descriptive 
reorientation in turn decenters the federal government’s role in setting 
immigration enforcement policy. Additionally, it prompts an opportunity 
to explore the powerful role that cities can and should play in immigration 
regulation and enforcement. To be sure, this Part acknowledges that 
immigration localism is not without legal and political peril for 
immigration advocates.34 While recognizing some of these important 
                                                                                                                           
 33. For discussion of the law of localism as grounds for local autonomy, see David J. 
Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377, 383 (2001) (arguing 
that central lawmaking authority can promote local autonomy “by altering the kinds of 
limits on local authority that are already, and necessarily, established by less visible 
provisions of central law”); Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 32, at 9–10 
(describing two waves of constitutional amendments that states adopted after the Civil War 
in order to strengthen the autonomy of local governments); Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 381 (1990) 
[hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part II] (discussing how state aid programs integral 
to funding newly emerging suburban school districts “allowed suburbs to be politically 
separate from the city and still enjoy high-quality municipal services without bearing 
unduly burdensome costs”). 
 34. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 
Yale L.J. 954, 958–59 (2019) [hereinafter Davidson, Dilemma of Localism] (describing 
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concerns, we suggest that, in the balance, local discretion to disengage 
from immigration enforcement will better serve the goals of immigrant 
integration and civic engagement for both citizens and noncitizens alike. 
In the end, the emerging federal and state anti-sanctuary trends are 
forcing reconsideration of the legal doctrines and theories that underlie 
efforts to protect state and local sanctuary policies. This Essay uses the 
advent of those trends to promote the thesis that localism and local 
autonomy make sense for immigration law, at least as it concerns 
enforcement efforts. At the same time, our defense of localism in the 
context of immigration enforcement is contingent and guarded. Whether 
immigration scholars and advocates are willing to fully embrace 
immigration localism may depend on how effectively those same scholars 
and advocates manage the risks associated with this form of structural 
power allocation. Regardless, our hope is that this Essay spurs an 
academic and practical conversation and provides readers with the tools 
to assess the costs and benefits of this legal and theoretical shift. 
I. THE DIVERGENCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE ANTI-SANCTUARY 
A new front in the war against sanctuary cities is emerging. Local 
leaders have long contended with federal efforts to compel their 
participation in immigration enforcement.35 In recent years, however, 
they are finding themselves facing a new and more formidable foe—their 
own states. This Part traces anti-sanctuary efforts at both the federal and 
state level. More importantly, this Part explains why the recent wave of 
state anti-sanctuary laws consists of statutes that are more expansive, 
more punitive, and more effective than their federal counterparts. The 
locus of the anti-sanctuary movement is shifting from the federal level to 
the states, we argue, because of the way that state anti-sanctuary laws 
circumvent many of the federal constitutional limitations that cities and 
other localities have used to challenge federal anti-sanctuary efforts thus 
far. 
A. The Plight of Federal Anti-Sanctuary 
More than any President before him, Trump has placed the crackdown 
on sanctuary cities at the center of his Administration’s immigration 
enforcement strategy.36 Yet his attacks also follow a long-standing federal 
                                                                                                                           
localism as a “double-edged” sword because, conceptually, local autonomy can be used to 
advance progressive, conservative, or other causes). 
 35. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty 
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 1381–84 (2006) [hereinafter 
Pham, Local Sovereignty] (examining federal attempts to engage state and local 
cooperation in immigration enforcement); infra section I.A. 
 36. Muzaffar Chisti & Jessica Bolter, Trump Administration Ratchets Up Pressure on 
“Sanctuary” Jurisdictions, Migration Policy Inst. (Feb. 22, 2018), https:// 
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-administration-ratchets-pressure-sanctuary-jurisdictions 
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effort to gain local cooperation in the enforcement of federal 
immigration law.37 Historically, these efforts have included a mix of 
encouragement and prohibitions. In 1996, for example, Congress passed 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA), which added section 287(g) to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), creating a federal program whereby local officials 
can be trained and “deputized” as federal agents for immigration 
enforcement purposes.38 The IIRIRA also included a provision, now 
codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1373, addressing what was then the most common 
local sanctuary policy.39 More specifically, § 1373 made it illegal for state 
or local governments to “prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government 
entity or official from sending to, or receiving from [federal immigration 
authorities] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”40 And to this day, § 1373 remains 
the sole anti-sanctuary provision that has been enacted into federal law. 
Despite Congress’s strong desire to secure local cooperation in 1996,41 
the laws that it enacted were notably limited. Specifically, neither section 
287(g) nor § 1373 required local involvement in federal immigration 
enforcement.42 As a result, political debates about sanctuary cities 
continued to escalate throughout the following decades as both federal 
and local policies evolved. On the federal front, starting in the mid-
2000s, immigration enforcement strategies were increasingly designed 
around local participation.43 At the same time, while many cities amended 
their local sanctuary policies to permit voluntary communications 
between local officials and federal immigration authorities in response to 
§ 1373, they also added new limitations not specifically barred by federal 
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/HE92-S9KL]; Sanctuary Cities and Trump’s Immigration Policy, Vox 
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/23/17144378/sanctuary-cities-trumps-
immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/U3WE-A7JS]. 
 37. See Pham, Local Sovereignty, supra note 35. 
 38. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, sec. 133, § 287(g)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g)(1) (2012)). 
 39. Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 277 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that 
Congress viewed apprehension of undocumented immigrants who remain undetected a 
high priority and intended to “give State and local officials the authority to communicate 
with the INS regarding the presence, whereabouts, and activities of” undocumented 
immigrants); see also Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussing the 
legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1373). 
 42. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g), 1373. 
 43. See Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1339, 1356–73 
(2013) [hereinafter Su, The States of Immigration] (examining the historical trajectory of 
state involvement in immigration policymaking and suggesting that “state involvement in 
the immigration context has long been driven by political actors seeking to reshape the 
federal policy-making process”). 
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law, such as prohibitions against inquiring about immigration-related 
information or constraints on when local officials may detain individuals 
solely on the basis of an alleged immigration violation.44 These two 
developments began to change the way sanctuary was perceived in the 
political fight over immigration. No longer were sanctuary policies simply 
a limit on local assistance. Given the centrality of local participation in 
the new federal strategy, sanctuary policies were increasingly derided as 
an outright attack on federal immigration enforcement itself. 
The limited scope of federal anti-sanctuary laws like § 1373 explains 
why past presidential administrations largely dealt with local resistance to 
federal immigration enforcement through workarounds45 and encour-
agements.46 The Trump Administration, however, has opted for a more 
direct and punitive approach. Within days of his inauguration, Trump 
issued Executive Order 13768, which, among other things, denies federal 
funds not only to “sanctuary jurisdictions” that “willfully refuse to comply 
with 8 U.S.C. 1373” but also to those that have “in effect a statute, policy, 
or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of Federal law.”47 
Attorney General Sessions promptly followed through by conditioning 
eligibility for a longstanding, Department of Justice–administered law 
enforcement grant program on compliance with access and notice 
requirements that go well beyond what is required under § 1373.48 At the 
                                                                                                                           
 44. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Sanctuary Cities, Government Records, and the Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine, 69 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1553, 1557–59 (2017) (discussing how 
New York City changed its policy to comply with § 1373); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, 
Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1449, 1455 
(2006) (describing a reason for the local shift from “don’t tell” sanctuary policies that are 
barred by § 1373 to “don’t ask” and “don’t enforce” policies that arguably are not). 
 45. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Deportation Program Sows Mistrust, U.S. Is Told, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 15, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/us/politics/deportation-
program-draws-more-criticism.html [https://perma.cc/E5LJ-V6ML] (describing the controversy 
over the Secure Communities program, which turned fingerprinting by local law 
enforcement into an immigration screening program). 
 46. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants Remains Policy, N.Y. 
Times (Aug. 3, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/us/politics/04immig.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WFN-L7ME] (describing the Obama Administration’s decision to expand 
the 287(g) program, which “allows for cooperation between federal immigration agents 
and state and local police agencies”). 
 47. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter 
Sanctuary Cities E.O.]. More specifically, section 9(a) of the Executive Order stated that 
because it is the policy of the executive branch to ensure that a state and all its political 
subdivisions comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, those jurisdictions that refuse to comply with the 
statute would not be eligible to receive federal grants. See id. Further, section 9(b) 
explained that the Secretary of Homeland Security would publish a list of jurisdictions that 
“failed to honor any detainers” with respect to noncitizens who have committed certain 
crimes. Id. 
 48. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278–80 (2018) (discussing Attorney 
General Sessions’s imposition of new conditions on Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant Program recipients). 
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same time, the political attacks against sanctuary cities continued to 
escalate.49 
Since the implementation of Trump’s Executive Order and the 
DOJ’s conditions, a number of localities—including Chicago, Philadelphia, 
and Santa Clara County—have gone to court to challenge these federal 
efforts to defund sanctuary jurisdictions.50 In turn, a number of federal 
courts have issued sweeping injunctions against the Administration’s 
policies.51 Some courts held that as a matter of statutory delegation, the 
President lacks the power to deny federal funds to sanctuary jurisdictions 
without further Congressional authorization.52 In addition, one court 
concluded that requiring cities to actively participate in federal immigration 
enforcement as a condition of receiving federal grants violates the 
Constitution’s prohibition against federal commandeering.53 
Indeed, localities have broadened their legal challenges to include 
not only the legality of these federal anti-sanctuary efforts but also the 
federal law upon which they are based. As a result, there are signs that 
§ 1373, the sole federal anti-sanctuary provision, might be violating the 
anticommandeering doctrine.54 Thus, although the Trump Administration’s 
political attacks on sanctuary cities continue apace, the federal 
government’s anti-sanctuary policies have stalled. Not only have Trump’s 
efforts to defund sanctuary cities largely been enjoined, but the Admin-
istration’s attempt to leverage and expand § 1373 may have also 
backfired, with the law itself in constitutional jeopardy. 
                                                                                                                           
 49. See, e.g., Katie Benner et al., Mayors Cancel Meeting with Trump as Justice Dept. 
Squeezes Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. Times (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
01/24/us/politics/sanctuary-cities-justice-department.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); see also supra note 36. 
 50. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive & Mandamus Relief at 
1, City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-03894-
MMB), 2018 WL 626280; Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 5, City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-5720), 2017 WL 
3386388; Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3–4, County of Santa Clara v. 
Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 317-cv-00574-WHO), 2017 WL 412999. 
 51. City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 593 (issuing a nationwide injunction against 
anti-sanctuary conditions on the Justice Assistance Grant Program); City of Chicago, 264 F. 
Supp. 3d at 951 (same). 
 52. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 646; City of Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 
943. 
 53. See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1215–16 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 54. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 651; City of Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 
949. The courts reconsidered their earlier holdings on the constitutionality of § 1373 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA, which held that for Tenth 
Amendment purposes, the distinction between precluding and affirmatively requiring 
state action was “empty.” 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018); see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 
321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 866–73 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 
3d 289, 329–31 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
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B. The Rise of State Anti-Sanctuary 
While federal anti-sanctuary efforts have stalled, a separate but 
parallel anti-sanctuary campaign is mounting. In the past four years, 
seven states have enacted anti-sanctuary laws,55 including S.B. 4 in Texas, 
which has been the subject of intense litigation and public scrutiny.56 
Meanwhile, similar laws have been introduced or passed in at least 
seventeen states.57 To be sure, state anti-sanctuary laws are not new.58 
Moreover, they have long been intertwined with anti-sanctuary efforts at 
the federal level.59 But the most recent wave reveals some alarming 
trends. Their numbers are growing, their scope expanding, their 
penalties more severe. Taken together, state anti-sanctuary laws today 
represent the most significant effort thus far to conscript local officials into 
federal immigration enforcement. 
The expanding scope of today’s state anti-sanctuary laws is most 
apparent with respect to how sanctuary is defined. States are increasingly 
turning to catch-all provisions to define the types of sanctuary measures 
that are prohibited. Indiana and North Carolina, for example, prohibit 
cities from limiting or restricting their involvement in immigration 
enforcement to anything “less than the full extent permitted by federal 
law.”60 States are also beginning to target local activities that fall short of 
formal policies. For example, Texas’s anti-sanctuary law applies to 
“patterns and practice[s]”61 and forbids mere expressions of support for 
sanctuary policies by punishing local officials who “endorse” any limitations 
on their city’s involvement in immigration enforcement.62 Similarly, Iowa’s 
                                                                                                                           
 55. See Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (2018); Ind. Code §§ 5-2-18.2-3–4 (2018); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 25-1-119 (2019); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 153A-145.5, 160A-205.2 (2018); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 4-42-103 (2019); S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codified 
at Iowa Code § 825.4). 
 56. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053 
(2017)); see also City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Before SB4 
could go into effect, several Texas cities, counties, local law-enforcement and city officials, 
and advocacy groups challenged the law in three consolidated actions.”). 
 57. See supra note 13. 
 58. Anti-sanctuary measures, for example, were included in two controversial state 
efforts to regulate immigration: Proposition 187, a voter initiative passed by California in 
1994, and S.B. 1070, enacted by the Arizona legislature in 2010. See League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786–87 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding a 
preliminary injunction against California’s Proposition 187); S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2010). Arizona’s S.B. 1070 also spawned similar anti-sanctuary legislation in 
other states. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-29-101 (2012) (repealed 2013); Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 36-80-23 (2012); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307 (West 2012); S.C. Code Ann. § 6-1-170 (2011). 
 59. See infra section I.C. 
 60. Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-4; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-205.2. 
 61. Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(2). 
 62. Id. § 752.051(a)(1). A preliminary injunction against this “endorsement” provision 
was recently upheld by a federal appellate court, but only with respect to elected local 
officials. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 185 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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law targets “informal, unwritten polic[ies],”63 and local officials cannot 
“discourage” any other official from inquiring about immigration status 
or assisting in immigration enforcement.64 Finally, a proposed bill in 
Florida covers “procedures” and “customs”65 and prohibits local 
representatives from voting in favor of a sanctuary policy irrespective of 
whether such a policy is actually enacted or implemented.66 
This expanding scope is being paired with new mandates with 
respect to what cities must do. Federal law does not require local officials 
to assist federal immigration enforcement efforts, much less actively 
engage in federal immigration enforcement themselves. Even the 
“immigration detainers” issued by the federal government are, as many 
courts have now held, simply requests that local law enforcement officials 
continue to maintain custody of an individual suspected of unauthorized 
entry, but not an order that they do so.67 State anti-sanctuary laws, 
however, are now making mandatory what had long been discretionary. 
States like Iowa and Tennessee now require all local law enforcement 
agencies in the state to comply with federal detainer requests.68 In 
addition, Texas also requires local officials to notify federal authorities 
about the release of anyone suspected to be an unauthorized immigrant 
and allow federal officials full access to local detention facilities.69 
Alabama’s law goes even further and subcontracts local officials to the 
federal government by requiring them to “fully comply with and . . . 
support the enforcement of federal [immigration] law.”70 
Finally, penalties for violating the statutes in the most recent wave of 
state anti-sanctuary laws have become more severe. Traditionally, when a 
local policy is preempted by state law that policy is simply rendered 
unenforceable. In the anti-sanctuary context, however, states are imposing 
sanctions directly upon local residents and officials.71 Nearly all of the 
                                                                                                                           
 63. S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codified at Iowa Code 
§ 825.1). 
 64. Id. § 825.4. 
 65. H.B. 9, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Fla. 2018). 
 66. See id. 
 67. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that “a 
conclusion that a detainer issued by a federal agency is an order that state and local 
agencies are compelled to follow, is inconsistent with the anti-commandeering principle of 
the Tenth Amendment”). 
 68. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-42-102(3)(D), 4-42-103 (2019); S.F. 481, 87th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codified at Iowa Code § 825.2). 
 69. Tex. Gov’t Code § 772.0073 (2017) (requiring that local entities “enforc[e] 
immigration laws” and “comply[] with, honor[], or fulfill[] immigration detainer 
requests” to receive funds from the Enforcement of Immigration Law Grant Program). 
 70. Ala. Code § 31-13-5(b) (2018). 
 71. See, e.g., Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 1997 (“Several states have 
adopted punitive preemption laws that do not merely nullify inconsistent local rules—the 
traditional effect of preemption—but rather impose harsh penalties on local officials or 
governments simply for having such measures on their books.”). 
850 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:837 
new anti-sanctuary laws being considered or enacted deny state funding 
to any city or locality that violates their prohibitions or mandates.72 In 
addition, states like Texas now authorize fines, sometimes as high as 
$25,000 a day, against cities that fail to comply.73 States are also seeking to 
make local communities legally liable for the actions of unauthorized 
immigrants. A bill proposed in North Carolina, for example, strips cities 
that violate its anti-sanctuary statute of all governmental tort immunity 
for any crime committed by an undocumented immigrant.74 The 
proposed anti-sanctuary bill in Florida goes even further by allowing 
anyone to sue a sanctuary city for personal injury or property damage 
committed by an unauthorized immigrant.75 
Even more troubling are the escalating sanctions against local 
officials themselves. Local officials who violate Texas’s anti-sanctuary law 
can be forced out of office, and those who fail to comply with a federal 
immigration detainer request can be charged with a crime.76 In Alabama, 
fines are levied not against the community as a whole but rather directly 
against the local officials themselves.77 Indeed, even if an official does not 
personally violate the anti-sanctuary law, she can still be charged with a 
crime in Alabama for failing to report a violation committed by someone 
else.78 Iowa’s anti-sanctuary law does not punish local officials directly. 
Nevertheless, it too threatens local officials with removal by allowing state 
funding to be restored earlier if the officials responsible for the anti-
sanctuary violation leave their positions.79 
In substance and scope, then, the recent wave of state anti-sanctuary 
laws is more expansive and punitive than what has been attempted thus 
far at the federal level, even by the Trump Administration. But whereas 
cities are successfully challenging federal anti-sanctuary efforts in court,80 
state anti-sanctuary laws have largely avoided judicial scrutiny. Among the 
seven anti-sanctuary laws that were recently enacted, only one—S.B. 4 in 
Texas81—has faced serious legal challenge. And while the cities and 
counties challenging S.B. 4 prevailed at the district court level, the 
injunction was largely overturned by the Fifth Circuit on appeal.82 
                                                                                                                           
 72. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 752.053, 752.056–.0565; Iowa S.F. 481; H.B. 2315, 110th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018); S.B. 145, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). 
 73. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.056. 
 74. See N.C. S.B. 145. 
 75. See H.B. 9, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018). 
 76. Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.0565; Tex. Penal Code § 39.07 (2017). 
 77. See Ala. Code § 31-13-5(d) (2018). 
 78. See id. § 31-13-5(f). 
 79. See S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codified at Iowa 
Code § 825.10). 
 80. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
 81. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1)). 
 82. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 191–92 (5th Cir. 2018). The challenging 
cities prevailed only on First Amendment grounds, with the court upholding the district 
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C. The Legal Distinction Between Federal and State Anti-Sanctuary 
While both federal and state anti-sanctuary attacks are politically 
intertwined and directed toward the same goal, their legal fortunes 
appear to be diverging. Although it is the federal government that is 
presumed to possess plenary power over immigration and exclusive 
authority over its enforcement,83 in the anti-sanctuary context it is state 
law that appears to be succeeding when federal efforts have failed. 
This outcome is not so peculiar when viewed in light of the type of 
legal challenges localities can raise against these federal and state anti-
sanctuary efforts. Until now, local governments have largely relied on 
exploiting the federalism divide between the federal government and the 
states in challenging federal anti-sanctuary efforts and state immigration 
laws.84 Cities can assume the legal standing of the state in arguing that 
federal anti-sanctuary laws impinge upon state sovereignty.85 They can 
also assume the legal position of the federal government in asserting that 
state immigration laws are preempted by federal law.86 But the structure 
                                                                                                                           
court’s injunction with respect to the law’s prohibition against the “endorsement” of 
policies that materially limit immigration enforcement, but solely with respect to elected 
officials. See id. at 185. 
 83. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
609–10 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty 
belonging to the government of the United States, . . . the right to its exercise at any 
time . . . cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.”); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 255, 255 (explaining that the plenary power doctrine causes the Court to view 
federal immigration statutes permissively). For an argument that the plenary power 
doctrine still persists today despite attempts to undermine it, see Rubenstein & 
Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 594. 
 84. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 85. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2017) 
(discussing the legal protections of state sovereignty in the context of a city directing its 
employees not to comply with a federal program).  
 86. The City of Los Angeles, for example, intervened as a plaintiff to argue that 
Proposition 187 was preempted by federal law. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 n.2, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In the federal government’s 
challenge against Arizona’s S.B. 1070, local officials provided declarations that the federal 
government included with its initial complaint. See Declaration of Tony Estrada at 2, 
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2010/07/06/declaration-of-tony-
estrada.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ9T-5N5M] (arguing that the Arizona law would shift 
scarce police resources away from “combating serious crime”); Declaration of Phoenix 
Police Chief Jack Harris at 1–2, Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/declaration-of-jack-harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Q9GG-XW7H] (arguing that the Arizona law would have a negative effect on police 
relations with the community); Declaration of Roberto Villaseñor at 3, Arizona, 703 F. 
Supp. 2d 980 (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
opa/legacy/2010/07/06/declaration-of-roberto-villasenor.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMS5-
32GK] (arguing that the Arizona law would unwisely force local police to enforce 
immigration laws over serious crimes, such as drug trafficking). Arizona cities later filed 
briefs as amici in support of the federal government’s preemption claim. See Amicus Curiae 
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of state anti-sanctuary laws and their unique interaction with federal law 
deny cities and other localities the ability to raise the same kind of 
federal constitutional claims that they have successfully used in the past. 
It is for this reason, this Essay argues, that state anti-sanctuary laws are 
proliferating at precisely the same time that federal anti-sanctuary efforts 
are stalling. 
To see this requires us to recognize two features of our federal 
system. The first is that while the Constitution gives the federal 
government broad authority to preempt state and local laws, especially 
with respect to immigration, the federalism structure of the United States 
also prohibits the federal government from commandeering states to 
implement federal policies.87 The second is that while cities and other 
localities often act as independent governments, as a matter of law they 
are largely understood to be nothing more than creatures of the state.88 
It is in large part because of the anticommandeering doctrine that 
federal anti-sanctuary efforts thus far have been so limited. Here we have 
to remember that the federal interest in anti-sanctuary is not simply in 
repealing local sanctuary policies but more specifically in compelling the 
active participation of local governments in federal immigration 
enforcement. And while the anticommandeering doctrine is principally 
concerned about the sovereignty of states, as “creatures of the state,” 
cities and other localities have historically assumed the legal standing of 
their states in contesting federal commandeering.89 This is why the sole 
                                                                                                                           
Brief of the Arizona Cities of Flagstaff, Tolleson, San Luis, & Somerton in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645), 2010 
WL 5162523; Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the City of Tucson in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellee, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162524. 
 87. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal 
government cannot circumvent the anticommandeering doctrine “by conscripting the 
States’ officers directly” or “those [officers] of their political subdivisions”); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the 
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”). 
 88. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (explaining that the 
power of the state to modify the privileges of, or repeal the charter of and destroy, 
municipalities is “unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States”). 
It is worth noting, however, that there have been competing formulations of the state–
local relationship. See, e.g., People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871) 
(Cooley, J., concurring) (arguing that local government is an “absolute right” protected 
from the powers of the legislatures); Eugene McQuillan, A Treatise on the Law of 
Municipal Corporations § 190, at 268 (1st ed. 1911) (arguing that the right to local self-
government is a “private” right not subject to state supremacy); see also generally Gerald 
E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1111–12 (1980) (describing 
and critiquing the emergence of the state creature conceptualization of cities in American 
law). 
 89. This is why so many of the seminal federalism decisions of the Supreme Court on 
state rights involve legal challenges from cities and counties, rather than states themselves. 
See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (brought by local 
transportation authority); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (brought by 
cities). Justice Stevens remarked on this trend in his dissenting opinion in Printz. Printz, 
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anti-sanctuary provision in federal law, § 1373,90 cannot and does not 
require local governments to communicate with federal authorities.91 
The anticommandeering doctrine also explains why cities have been so 
effective in blocking the Trump Administration’s efforts to deny federal 
funding to local jurisdictions that refuse to comply with immigration 
detainers, provide notice of an immigrant’s release, or allow the federal 
government access to local facilities to assume custody of detained 
immigrants.92 Moreover, recent decisions by lower courts to hold that 
§ 1373 is itself unconstitutional—as limited as it is—are based on the 
recent expansion of the anticommandeering doctrine by the Supreme 
Court to cover not only federal mandates for affirmative state or local 
action but also federal efforts to prohibit states and localities from taking 
specific actions.93 
State law preemption, however, offers anti-sanctuary proponents a legal 
means of working around the constraints of the anticommandeering 
doctrine. The anticommandeering doctrine is derived from the 
federalism structure outlined by the U.S. Constitution and the independent 
sovereignty that it preserves in the several states.94 The Constitution, 
however, accords no such status to cities in their dealings with the state.95 
Indeed, the “state creature” idea that allows cities to become the state 
when contesting federal law cuts against them when the commandeering 
argument is directed against their own state.96 After all, if localities are 
                                                                                                                           
521 U.S. at 955 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]hese cases do not involve the enlistment 
of state officials at all, but only an effort to have federal policy implemented by officials of 
local government.”). 
 90. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012). 
 91. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that 
§ 1373 does not commandeer local officials because it “prohibit[s] state and local 
governmental entities or officials only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of 
immigration information” (emphasis added)). 
 92. Technically, the federal government possesses the “power of the purse” to 
condition federal funding on requirements that it cannot enact directly through federal 
law. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205–06 (1987). But the Supreme Court 
has also held that when the condition is coercive and compels the relinquishment of a 
constitutional right, the federal government creates an “unconstitutional condition.” See 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–81 (2012). It is on this ground 
that courts have called into question federal defunding efforts against sanctuary jurisdcitions. 
See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1216 (2017) (enjoining the 
denial of federal funding because the anti-sanctuary conditions unconstitutionally coerce 
localities to adopt a federal regulatory program in violation of the Tenth Amendment 
prohibition against commandeering); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 
651 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (noting that anti-sanctuary conditions attached to federal funding 
“implicate the Tenth Amendment and its built-in anti-commandeering principles,” but 
granting a preliminary injunction on other grounds). 
 93. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479–81 (2018). 
 94. See id. at 1479. 
 95. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 1163, 
1217 (2018). 
 96. See id. 
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simply administrative subdivisions of the state, as the Supreme Court has 
at times described them,97 then their “commandeering” by states may not 
only be constitutionally permitted, but constitutionally encouraged. And 
as creatures and subdivisions, it might also be constitutionally expected 
for states to be able to punish localities for noncompliance with state law 
in ways that the federal government cannot. 
As a result, threats of state defunding have not met the same fate as 
federal defunding.98 Cities may feel just as, if not more, coerced when the 
state conditions grant funding on the repeal of local sanctuary policies. 
In fact, cities tend to be far more reliant on state aid than they are on 
federal.99 But localities do not have a federal constitutional right to be 
free from state commandeering.100 Thus, while making all state funding 
contingent on local participation in federal immigration enforcement 
might be coercive, such conditions do not force cities and other localities 
to give up a federal constitutional right. By turning to state law, then, 
anti-sanctuary advocates are able to compel local participation in ways 
that federal law cannot. 
Moreover, state anti-sanctuary laws have been able to avoid preemption 
themselves because of existing federal anti-sanctuary policies. Indeed, 
preemption was precisely what befell Proposition 187, which was adopted 
by California voters in 1994 and included the first anti-sanctuary 
provision enacted into law.101 A federal district court enjoined its 
implementation for infringing upon the federal government’s exclusive 
authority over immigration regulation and its enforcement.102 Since 
Proposition 187, and perhaps in response to its defeat,103 however, 
Congress amended federal law to encourage precisely the kind of local 
participation that states are now seeking to mandate. This included the 
1996 addition of section 287(g) and § 1373.104 Federal encouragement is 
                                                                                                                           
 97. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (describing local 
governments as “political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for 
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them”). 
 98. See supra sections I.A–.B. 
 99. See, e.g., David Berman, Local Government and the States: Autonomy, Politics, 
and Policy 92 (Routledge 2015) (2003) (explaining that about thirty-five percent of cities’ 
total revenue comes from state governments, while only four percent comes from the 
federal government). 
 100. See Schragger, supra note 95, at 1217. 
 101. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995) (describing Proposition 187’s provisions, which required law enforcement and 
other local government personnel to check “the immigration status of persons with whom 
they come in contact,” report the individuals “to state and federal officials,” and “deny 
those persons social services, health care, and education”). 
 102. See id. at 786–87. 
 103. See Su, The States of Immigration, supra note 43, at 1373–78 (describing how 
“political actors . . . were able to leverage” Proposition 187’s defeat in court “into a 
national controversy that made federal reforms much more likely”). 
 104. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
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also expressed in a separate provision of § 1373 that specifically requires 
the federal government to respond to all inquiries about immigration 
status that it receives from local law enforcement.105 These amendments 
and the increasing federal reliance on local cooperation are why the 
Supreme Court, when asked to rule on the constitutionality of a 
controversial immigration enforcement law enacted by Arizona in 2010, 
upheld the law’s anti-sanctuary mandate despite finding the rest of the 
law preempted.106 As the Court noted, the “federal scheme” now in place 
“leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a 
routine matter.”107 Similarly, in City of El Cenizo v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the localities’ federal preemption argument against S.B. 4 
because of the various encouragements of local involvement in 
immigration enforcement found in federal law.108 
In short, state anti-sanctuary laws are proliferating precisely because 
of the legal advantages they possess over their federal counterparts. They 
are free from the federal constitutional constraints that have limited 
federal anti-sanctuary efforts thus far. Unlike other state immigration 
laws in the past, they also avoid federal preemption because of the extent 
to which they further federal interests and are intertwined with federal 
law. The consequence is that cities and other localities are denied the 
traditional legal strategies that have served them well in the past. If local 
sanctuary policies are to be defended against the rise of state anti-
sanctuary laws, a new set of legal arguments will need to be developed. 
II. STATE ANTI-SANCTUARY THROUGH A LOCALIST LENS 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in City of El Cenizo v. Texas illustrates the 
uphill legal battle that localities face in challenging state anti-sanctuary 
laws on federal constitutional grounds. But its treatment of an ancillary 
and largely overlooked local autonomy argument, based in part on the 
Texas constitution,109 also suggests the possibility of a different frame of 
analysis and a separate line of attack. When viewed through a lens of 
localism rather than federalism, the proliferation of these state laws also 
calls attention to the need to examine in closer detail how they fit within 
the legal structure that governs the relation between states and their 
localities. This Part explores what an immigration localism analysis might 
look like. In addition, it shines light on the doctrinal insights and legal 
claims that such an analysis reveals. 
                                                                                                                           
 105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012) (“[INS] shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, 
State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or 
immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose 
authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.”). 
 106. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 411–13, 416 (2012). 
 107. Id. at 412–13. 
 108. See 890 F.3d 164, 176–82 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 109. See id. at 191. 
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Of course, to say that localism matters in the state anti-sanctuary 
context does not mean that immigration localism arguments will 
guarantee legal victory for cities. Litigating in federal court, the local 
plaintiffs in El Cenizo chose to frame their local autonomy argument 
through a federal constitutional lens—what the court described as a 
“hybrid Tenth Amendment and [federal] preemption claim.”110 And 
although the Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that it need not address 
this argument because it was not raised at the district court level,111 the 
court also dismissed the argument on substantive grounds. Because the 
Texas Constitution “prohibits a city from acting in a manner inconsistent 
with the general laws of the state,” the court explained,112 the state clearly 
has the power to “‘commandeer’ its municipalities in this way.”113 
But the indirect means by which localism was raised in El Cenizo, and 
the cursory manner in which it was dismissed, also suggest the need for 
further inquiry. Was the Fifth Circuit correct in concluding that the 
state’s power to preempt necessarily includes the power to commandeer? 
And if that is indeed the case in Texas, is it the same in other states? 
Answering these questions requires a closer look at how state constitutions 
and laws define the relationship between states and their localities, how 
that relationship varies between states, and the nuances connected with 
that legal development over time. Moreover, the particular features of 
state anti-sanctuary laws today could implicate localism concerns in ways 
that differ from other state preemption statutes. Ultimately, we conclude 
that localism makes possible a set of heretofore unrecognized legal 
claims and doctrinal considerations that certain localities might use to 
stem the coming tide of state anti-sanctuary legislation. 
A. Localism and the Legal Standing of Localities 
To understand the significance of localism in the anti-sanctuary 
context, we have to go beyond the fact that cities and other localities are 
mere “creatures of the state.”114 It is also important to examine how the 
state–local relationship is defined as a matter of state law. Here, we show 
that the power of states over localities is not absolute. Indeed, like the 
trajectory of federalism, the development of localism in many states has 
been toward expanding local autonomy and increasing limits on state 
interference. 
The power of local governments is one area that has seen this 
expansion of local autonomy. This expansion is evident in the fact that 
the vast majority of states have moved their localism structure away from 
                                                                                                                           
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. (quoting Tyra v. City of Houston, 822 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. 1991)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32. 
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“Dillon’s Rule” and toward “home rule.”115 To be sure, both doctrines 
presume that, as state creatures, cities and localities possess only those 
powers that have been specifically delegated to them by the state.116 How 
they differ is in the extent of the state’s delegation and how courts are 
instructed to interpret them.  
In “Dillon’s Rule” states, for example, the power of localities tends 
to be limited to a specific list of enumerated powers.117 Moreover, the 
doctrine instructs courts to interpret the scope of such delegations 
narrowly and presume against finding such delegation in close cases.118 
For individuals, private corporations, and state governments, the 
standard view is that they have the power and freedom to act unless 
specifically prohibited by state or federal law.119 Dillon’s Rule, however, 
reverses that baseline presumption for local governments: They are 
assumed to have no power to do anything unless an express or implied 
state delegation of authority can be identified.120 
In contrast, localities in home-rule states are granted a blanket 
delegation of power. This often includes the authority to enact local 
regulations without the need for further state authorization.121 Similarly, 
localities in home-rule states typically possess the ability to determine 
their own governmental structure through the adoption of a home-rule 
charter, in which the roles and responsibilities of local officials are 
defined.122 Of course, such broad delegations of home-rule authority are 
not without constraints. In many states, the scope of a locality’s home-
rule powers is limited to matters of municipal or local affairs.123 
Furthermore, most states still require local laws to be consistent with state 
                                                                                                                           
 115. See Dale Krane et al., Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook 14 (2001) 
(noting that home rule had been adopted in some form in forty-five states); Jon C. 
Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870–1900, at 103–31 
(1984) (describing the origins of municipal home rule in the 1870s and its subsequent 
expansion). 
 116. This is not unlike our understanding of federal power under federalism—namely, 
that the federal government’s authority is largely limited to the “enumerated powers” that 
were ceded by the states when the Constitution was ratified. 
 117. See, e.g., John F. Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 89 (1st 
ed. 1872). 
 118. See id. § 17. 
 119. See id. §§ 18–19. 
 120. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (noting that Dillon’s Rule refers to the concept that “cities possess only those 
powers that can be traced to explicit delegations of authority from the state” and that 
“cities are powerless to act” in the absence of such delegations); see also Frug, supra note 
88, at 1111–12. 
 121. See, e.g., 1 Chester James Antieau, Antieau’s Local Government: Municipal 
Corporation Law §§ 3.20–3.22 (1998). 
 122. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2257, 2290 (2003) 
[hereinafter Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule]; see also infra section II.B.1. 
 123. See Frug, supra note 88, at 1117. 
858 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:837 
laws, preserving in the state the power to preempt.124 Nevertheless, the 
widespread adoption of home rule itself reflects the legal trend among 
states toward expanding the power of local self-governance.125 
Another area in which the localism relationship has developed involves 
the protection of localities from state interference.126 In the nineteenth 
century, state legislatures frequently meddled in local affairs.127 In 
response, many state constitutions were amended to limit their ability to 
do so. Nearly all state constitutions now prohibit the state from enacting 
“local laws” or “special legislation” that targets or applies only to specific 
localities.128 Indeed, in some states, home rule does not just empower 
localities to regulate local affairs; it also grants such local laws immunity 
from state preemption.129 Over time, further protections have been 
added as well. For example, since the 1970s, more than a dozen states 
have adopted constitutional amendments that prohibit the state from 
imposing “unfunded mandates” that expand the responsibilities of local 
governments but do not provide sufficient state funds to carry them out.130 
                                                                                                                           
 124. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(g) (“Counties . . . shall have all powers of local 
self-government not inconsistent with general law . . . .”); see also Paul Diller, Intrastate 
Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1124–27 (2007). 
 125. See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 122, at 2277–88; Rick Su, Have 
Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 181, 190–91 (2017). 
 126. See Antieau, supra note 121, § 3.00 (describing home rule’s evolution from a 
Missouri constitutional amendment that was adopted in 1875). As a matter of law, home 
rule is not necessarily inconsistent with Dillon’s Rule; if Dillon’s Rule presumes that 
localities possess only those powers that have been delegated by state law, home rule serves 
as one form that such a delegation can take. But because the home rule delegation is so 
expansive, it is now common practice to classify states as either a home-rule or Dillon’s 
Rule state. See, e.g., Krane et al., supra note 115, at 14 –15. Moreover, within these broad 
classifications, variations exist with respect to how home rule or Dillon’s Rule is structured 
in any particular state. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Howard Lee McBain, The Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule 
263–64 (1916) (describing an 1899 lawsuit that challenged the ability of the California 
legislature to interfere with “municipal affairs”—in particular, local elections); Nancy 
Burns & Gerald Gamm, Creatures of the State: State Politics and Local Government, 1871-
1921, 33 Urb. Aff. Rev. 59, 62 (1997) (compiling data from the Alabama, Massachusetts, 
and Michigan state legislatures between 1871 and 1921 to demonstrate the outsized 
influence that state governments wielded in local affairs). 
 128. See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 122, at 2286–88 (describing 
efforts to rein in states’ power to “enact ‘special legislation’ that would apply only to 
particular localities”). 
 129. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XI, § 5(a) (empowering charter cities to “make and 
enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to 
restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other 
matters they shall be subject to general laws”); Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (“The people of 
each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants . . . are 
hereby vested with . . . power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or 
town, which shall . . . extend to all its local and municipal matters.”). 
 130. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Politics: Governing by Amendment in the 
American States 45–47 (2018) (describing state constitutional amendments that bar 
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Of course, the powers and protections of a particular locality depend 
on the specific localism structure in place in a given state. As such, the 
significance of localism in the state anti-sanctuary context varies not only 
between states but also sometimes between localities within a state. 
Consider, for example, some of the states that are now involved in the 
anti-sanctuary wave. Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia remain pure Dillon’s 
Rule states, having never embraced the home-rule movement.131 Iowa 
and North Carolina have both adopted home rule, but in the former 
home rule was adopted via constitutional amendment,132 while in the 
latter it exists purely as a statutory enactment subject to legislative 
exception.133 In Texas, home rule has been extended to major cities but 
specifically excludes counties, which leaves sanctuary jurisdictions like 
Travis County and its sheriff operating under Dillon’s Rule.134 And while 
nearly all states have some kind of prohibition on special legislation, 
including those now considered Dillon’s Rule states, limitations on 
unfunded mandates exist in only a few, such as Florida and Tennessee.135 
Moreover, how localism developments might translate into concrete 
legal claims requires further consideration. It is worth noting that many 
local-government-law scholars believe that the powers and protections 
that have been extended to localities often fail to live up to their 
promise—hobbled as they often are by narrow judicial constructions or 
creative state circumventions. Finally, localism claims remain, for the 
most part, untested and underdeveloped, especially in the context of 
immigration.  
So what might cities and their advocates gain by turning to localism 
in the anti-sanctuary context? It is to this that we now turn. 
                                                                                                                           
unfunded mandates outright or require states to shoulder at least some of the financial 
burden). 
 131. See, e.g., Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 403 So. 2d 893, 902 
(Ala. 1981) (“The governmental entity involved here, a municipality, derives all of its 
power from the state, and no municipality can legislate beyond what the state has either 
expressly or impliedly authorized.”); H.G. Brown Family Ltd. v. City of Villa Rica, 607 
S.E.2d 883, 885 (Ga. 2005) (“A municipality has no inherent power; it may only exercise 
power to the extent it has been delegated authority by the state. A municipality’s 
allocations of power from the state must be strictly construed.”); City of Richmond v. 
Confrere Club, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (Va. 1990) (“In determining the legislative powers of 
local governing bodies, Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of strict construction.”). 
 132. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A. 
 133. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-11 (2018). 
 134. See Forwood v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Tex. 1948) (establishing 
home rule for cities and towns); George D. Braden et al., The Constitution of the State of 
Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 652 (1977), https://www.sll.texas.gov/ 
assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8CYN-GHR6] (describing the adoption and repeal of county home 
rule in Texas). 
 135. See Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18(a); Tenn. Const. art. II, § 24. 
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B. The Localist Case Against State Anti-Sanctuary Legislation 
Drawing upon the localism structures outlined above, this section 
illustrates how localism might be used to contest the rise of state anti-
sanctuary legislation. Doing so requires turning a close eye toward the 
unique legal structure of today’s anti-sanctuary legislation and more 
specifically the ways in which those laws differ from other state 
preemption statutes. The claims discussed below are not meant to be 
exhaustive. Nor do we believe that such claims are possible in all states or 
against every type of state anti-sanctuary legislation. Indeed, our goal is 
simply to provide some examples of what a localist analysis might reveal. 
Moreover, this section sheds light on how localism might already be 
influencing the manner in which state anti-sanctuary laws are drafted and 
how it might be used to shape—both legally and politically—the 
development of state anti-sanctuary more generally. 
1. Home Rule as Anticommandeering. — Cities and other localities 
cannot invoke the federal anticommandeering doctrine in challenging 
state anti-sanctuary legislation. But something akin to a “state anti-
commandeering” claim might be raised in home-rule states. Such a claim 
would not be based, of course, on the Federal Constitution.136 Nevertheless, 
state constitutional provisions, especially those connected with the 
adoption of home rule, might serve as the basis for such an argument. 
To our knowledge, no state court has explicitly adopted a state 
anticommandeering doctrine in name. Yet in many states, such a 
doctrine may already exist in effect. Just as federal law distinguishes 
between permissible federal preemption and unconstitutional federal 
commandeering,137 state courts often do the same in interpreting the 
power of states in the context of home rule. A state may have broad 
authority to preempt local regulations. But, as we note below, courts have 
also held that states cannot direct the activities of local officials, or alter 
their duties and responsibilities, without running afoul of home rule. 
After all, home rule was adopted in many states in response to forcible 
state takeovers of municipal departments—such as fire and police—
                                                                                                                           
 136. However, there have been some efforts to develop a state anticommandeering 
doctrine based on the Federal Constitution. See Schragger, supra note 95, at 1218–19 
(proposing local anticommandeering principles as a tentative solution to efforts by the 
federal government to compel municipal officials to enforce federal immigration law); cf. 
David J. Barron, Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 487, 611 (1999) (arguing that despite not being mentioned in the Federal 
Constitution, localities have federal constitutional standing against their own states). 
 137. See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476–77 (2018) (describing the 
constitutional distinction between federal laws that regulate individuals directly by “requiring 
or prohibiting certain acts,” which Congress can do, and those that “directly . . . compel 
the States to require or prohibit those acts,” which it cannot). 
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which were common in the nineteenth century.138 And as noted above, 
one of the central powers delegated by home rule was the ability of local 
residents to frame municipal charters defining the structure of their local 
government and the roles and responsibilities of its officials.139 In this 
regard, the motivations behind home rule echo the same concerns 
behind the federal anticommandeering doctrine: to preserve and protect 
the independence and structural integrity of local governments. 
Indeed, cases prohibiting “state commandeering” can be found in a 
number of different states. In Missouri, for example, the state constitution 
specifically bars the state from “creating or fixing the powers, duties, or 
compensation of any municipal office or employment” of a home-rule 
city.140 As a result, Missouri courts have struck down state laws requiring a 
city to create an arbitration board141 or mandating that local officials 
serve on a board of examiners created by the state.142 In Ohio, courts 
have held that, under the state’s home-rule amendment, the “internal 
government of a municipality, such as . . . the powers, duties, and 
functions of municipal officers, are matters of local government, which 
may not be influenced or controlled by [state] laws.”143 Thus, the state 
cannot regulate how a city selects its police chief144 or otherwise control 
“the organization and regulation of its police force.”145 Other states 
similarly protect the independence of localities in managing their 
personnel and how local officials are removed.146 To be sure, not all 
                                                                                                                           
 138. See, e.g., McBain, supra note 127, at 35–39, 498 (describing, inter alia, an 
instance of “patent subterfuge,” in which the New York legislature co-opted local control 
of certain municipal police departments, and similar efforts by Colorado’s legislature). 
 139. See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text. 
 140. Mo. Const. art. VI, § 22. 
 141. See State ex rel. Burke v. Cervantes, 423 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Mo. 1968). 
 142. See State ex rel. Sprague v. City of St. Joseph, 549 S.W.2d 873, 881 (Mo. 1977). 
 143. Lorain St. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 148 N.E. 577, 580 (Ohio 1925) (Marshall, 
C.J., concurring); see also State ex rel. Strain v. Huston, 29 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1940) (holding that the power to create local offices, determine “when the performance of 
the duties of the office are distributed among subordinates,” and “prescribe rules and 
regulations to govern the time and manner of service by subordinates” is a matter of local 
self-government immune from state control). 
 144. State ex rel. Lynch v. City of Cleveland, 132 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ohio 1956) (holding 
that a city is not subject to state law in how it selects its police chief). 
 145. Harsney v. Allen, 113 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio 1953) (“The organization and regulation of 
its police force, as well as its civil service functions, are within a municipality’s powers of local 
self-government.”). 
 146. See, e.g., State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Oehler, 16 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Minn. 1944) 
(holding that adoption of a home-rule charter granted a municipality general legislative 
powers, including the power to remove a municipal official); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 
182 P.2d 762, 764 (Okla. 1947) (holding that the city charter provisions regarding the 
termination of “appointed officers or employees[] are solely matters of municipal concern 
and control over the general laws”); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1245–47 
(Pa. 2004) (holding that granting domestic-partnership benefits to employees in same-sex 
relationships is within a locality’s power over personnel and administration and not subject 
to the state’s power to regulate marriage or civil rights). 
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home-rule states have ruled against commandeering in this manner; in 
most states there are no decisions either way, and in others courts have 
explicitly upheld the state’s ability to dictate the duties and responsibilities 
of local officials.147 But these decisions suggest that localism is not necessarily 
blind to the distinction between preemption and commandeering that 
federalism draws. 
Just as federal anti-sanctuary efforts are limited by the federal 
anticommandeering doctrine, perhaps state anti-sanctuary laws are similarly 
constrained. After all, even more so than federal anti-sanctuary efforts, 
the goal of state anti-sanctuary laws is not merely to repeal local sanctuary 
policies but more specifically to fix the power and duties of local officials. 
Anti-sanctuary mandates direct local officials to take specific actions, 
including those that may not be authorized or approved by the local 
governments that they work for or the local residents that they serve.148 
Anti-sanctuary penalties threaten local officials with personal sanctions 
unless they choose to comply with the state’s demand that they prioritize 
federal immigration enforcement efforts above all other local 
responsibilities.149 
State anti-sanctuary laws may not be directly taking over municipal 
departments in the same way that they have done in the past. But the 
extent to which many state anti-sanctuary laws require localities to 
comply with all federal requests for assistance or action renders them, in 
effect, auxiliary departments of the federal government. In other words, 
if state preemption laws ordinarily concern what local governments can 
regulate, anti-sanctuary legislation targets how local governments are 
organized, structured, and managed. 
But if anti-sanctuary mandates implicate commandeering under 
home rule, can the same be said about state anti-sanctuary laws that 
contain only prohibitions? Just as 8 U.S.C. § 1373 avoids federal 
anticommandeering concerns,150 many state anti-sanctuary laws also 
impose no affirmative requirements and simply forbid the enactment of 
                                                                                                                           
 147. See State ex rel. Young v. Robinson, 112 N.W. 269, 270 (Minn. 1907) (explaining 
that when state laws operate within a municipality, “the municipality and its officers are . . . 
subject to the command and control[] of the state government at all times”); State ex rel. 
Burns v. Linn, 153 P. 826, 826 (Okla. 1915) (holding that the state of Oklahoma may 
impose duties and penalties upon local officers of the city of Tulsa). Interestingly, 
Minnesota and Oklahoma are the two states in which courts held that the removal of local 
officials is entirely a local affair not subject to state regulations. See Robinson, 112 N.W. at 
270; Linn, 153 P. at 830. 
 148. See supra section I.B. 
 149. See supra section I.B. 
 150. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that 
§ 1373 does not commandeer local officials because it “prohibit[s] state and local 
governmental entities or officials only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of 
immigration information”). 
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local sanctuary policies.151 Styling the anti-sanctuary law as a prohibition, 
however, may not be enough to save it from a commandeering claim. 
First, even if state anti-sanctuary laws rely entirely on prohibitions in 
theory, the breadth of those prohibitions may nevertheless constitute an 
implicit mandate in practice. By banning both formal policies and 
informal customs that limit cooperation with federal immigration 
authorities, local governments are essentially left with no alternative other 
than to permit or encourage such cooperation. Further, the escalating 
punitive measures152 strongly incentivize, if not directly compel, local 
officials to interpret such prohibition as affirmative mandates lest they 
risk losing state funding or facing personal sanctions. As noted earlier, 
federal courts are now reaching a similar conclusion in their analysis of 
§ 1373, which mirrors state anti-sanctuary in simply prohibiting local 
policies that limit local participation in immigration enforcement.153 As 
these courts are concluding, § 1373, though literally written as a 
prohibition, operates like a mandate in effect.154 Given these developments, 
a state court may see anti-sanctuary prohibitions in the same way. 
But even under a narrow view that anti-sanctuary prohibitions are 
just that—simply prohibitions and not commandeering—they might still 
constitute an interference with the power of local self-government under 
home rule. The goal of anti-sanctuary prohibitions is to ensure that line-
level officers have the irrevocable discretion, if they so choose, to 
participate in federal immigration enforcement.155 But in doing so, state 
anti-sanctuary laws severely constrain the ability of local governments to 
                                                                                                                           
 151. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307 (West 2018); H.B. 2315, 110th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018) (codified in scattered titles of the Tenn. Code Ann.) (prohibiting 
state and local governmental entities and officials from adopting sanctuary policies); see 
also H.B. 179, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017) (proposing to require “state and 
local authorities to cooperate with the federal government in the enforcement of 
immigration laws”). Interestingly, all three of these are also home-rule states. See supra 
section II.A. 
 152. See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. 
 153. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012); supra section I.A. 
 154. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The 
characterization of Section 1373 as a prohibition that requires no affirmative state 
action . . . does not accurately portray its practical import. Section 1373 mandates that 
state and city employees have the option of furnishing to the INS information on 
individuals’ immigration status while the employee is acting . . . as a state or local 
official.”). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 
(2018), courts have entirely rejected the prohibition versus mandate distinction in 
explicitly ruling Section 1373 unconstitutional. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. 
Supp. 3d 855, 869 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (rejecting the “command-versus-proscription 
dichotomy” in assessing Section 1373); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 
289, 329–31 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding that by “prohibiting certain conduct of government 
entities or officials,” Section 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment by “unequivocally 
dictat[ing] what a state legislature may and many not do” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478)). 
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 69–72. 
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oversee their workforces, control the use of municipal resources, and 
manage their internal administration. These laws effectively isolate local 
officers from the local governments that employ them. Indeed, anti-
sanctuary prohibitions may affect local personnel management beyond 
the immigration enforcement context. Given how broadly state anti-
sanctuary laws are now being written, simply requiring local law 
enforcement employees to adhere to the duties for which they are hired—
murder investigation, neighborhood outreach, parking enforcement—
may itself constitute less than full support for immigration enforcement 
or an impediment to cooperation with federal authorities. 
In short, contrary to what the Fifth Circuit concluded in City of El 
Cenizo,156 the power to preempt is not necessarily synonymous with the 
power to commandeer. Of course, whether state anticommandeering can 
be raised as a home-rule claim is far from settled. We suspect that in 
states like Missouri and Ohio,157 where the courts’ interpretation of home 
rule echoes the federal anticommandeering doctrine,158 a stronger case 
against anti-sanctuary might be made. Yet, in states like Texas, where 
home rule is unevenly allocated and there has been no decision 
protecting the local government structure of home-rule cities from state 
preemption,159 the prospects of such a case are less clear. As a result, the 
equivalence that the Fifth Circuit drew in City of El Cenizo between state 
preemption and state commandeering in the anti-sanctuary context may 
turn out to be the governing rule.160 But reaching that definitive 
conclusion would require a state law challenge that squarely places this 
question before a state court. 
2. Fiscal Accountability and Unfunded Mandates. — State anti-sanctuary 
laws also impose costs in ways that undermine fiscal accountability. Local 
governments have long complained about unfunded mandates, through 
which the state expands local responsibilities but does not provide the 
resources to carry them out or authorize a new revenue source to fund 
doing so.161 For local officials, the concerns involve the need to raise 
taxes or redirect resources from other priorities. As a policy matter, the 
worry is that unfunded mandates allow states to shirk the need to 
internalize the cost of their own policies, thus encouraging them to 
adopt inefficient laws that they would not otherwise enact.162 
                                                                                                                           
 156. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 191 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 157. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307 (West 2018); H.B. 179, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ohio 2017). 
 158. See supra notes 141–146 and accompanying text. 
 159. Recall that Texas accords home rule to cities, but not counties. See supra note 
134. 
 160. See City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 191. 
 161. See Berman, supra note 99, at 29, 32–35. 
 162. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1, 35–38 (2004) (stating that “the purchase price undermines Congress’s ability to use 
commandeering to externalize the costs of its regulation”). 
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Again, fiscal accountability has some connections with the federal 
anticommandeering doctrine. As the Supreme Court explained, if federal 
commandeering were widely permitted, “[m]embers of Congress” would 
be able to “take credit for ‘solving’ problems without having to ask their 
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.”163 But at 
the state level, the legal backlash against unfunded mandates has taken a 
more direct turn. As noted earlier, since the 1970s, more than a dozen 
states have adopted constitutional amendments limiting the states’ ability 
to impose unfunded mandates.164 The first, ratified by Tennessee in 1978, 
states that “[n]o law of general application shall impose increased 
expenditure requirements on cities or counties unless the General 
Assembly shall provide that the state share in the cost.”165 Subsequent 
amendments have gone even further, including New Hampshire’s, which 
bars the state from mandating additional programs or responsibilities 
“unless such programs or responsibilities are fully funded by the state,”166 
and Florida’s, which requires the state to provide funding for state 
mandates directly or authorize a new funding source that is capable of 
covering the additional costs.167 
Federal and state officials tend to talk about anti-sanctuary laws as 
law enforcement measures.168 But at the local level, they are widely seen 
as “unfunded mandates” requiring local officials to carry out a federal 
responsibility.169 The kinds of activities that state anti-sanctuary laws are 
                                                                                                                           
 163. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997). 
 164. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 165. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 24. 
 166. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 28-a. 
 167. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18. 
 168. See Gromer Jeffers Jr., Greg Abbot Defends Sanctuary Cities Law at Texas 
Sheriffs’ Meeting, Dall. Morning News (July 31, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/ 
news/texas-legislature/2017/07/31/greg-abbott-defends-sanctuary-cities-law-texas-sheriffs-
meeting (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Texas Governor Abbot’s views that 
S.B. 4’s ban against sanctuary cities prevents human trafficking and other crimes); Kevin 
Johnson, Sessions Defends Sanctuary Cities Lawsuit Against California, USA Today (Mar. 7, 
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/07/sessions-defends-sanctuary- 
cities-lawsuit-against-california/402936002/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing then-Attorney General Sessions’s intent to punish California and sanctuary 
cities for frustrating federal law enforcement); see also Sanctuary Cities E.O., supra note 
47 (explaining that the purpose of the Executive Order is to enforce immigration law and 
ensure the security of the country). 
 169. See, e.g., Ilyse Hogue, Alabama Immigration Law Recalls Darkest Moments in History, 
Guardian (Oct. 18, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/ 
oct/18/alabama-immigration-law (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting a county 
official describing the state’s anti-sanctuary law as “another unfunded mandate to a county 
struggling to keep its head above water”); Yucel Ors, Federal Government Should Fix the 
Immigration System, Not Cities, Nat’l League of Cities (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nlc.org/ 
article/federal-government-should-fix-the-immigration-system-not-cities [https://perma.cc/ 
J8ZB-P7TY] (“NLC’s long-standing position is that measures requiring cities to use local 
law enforcement resources to enforce federal immigration laws are unfunded mandates 
that impose additional disproportionate responsibilities on local law enforcement, increase 
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now mandating are expensive. Localities incur direct costs when they 
comply with federal detainer requests that are uncompensated by both 
the federal government making the request and by the state mandating 
compliance with the federal request.170 They also redirect manpower 
from other law enforcement priorities, such as when local police officers 
are allocated to immigration enforcement task forces at the request of 
the federal government.171 
In enacting anti-sanctuary legislation, states routinely tout the im-
portance of local participation to the interest and welfare of the state.172 
But none of the anti-sanctuary laws provide state funds to cover their 
open-ended mandates. S.B. 4 in Texas comes closest—by establishing a 
competitive grant program that cities can apply for and by agreeing to 
use state funds to indemnify localities for any liability incurred because of 
constitutional violations associated with federal detainer requests.173 Yet 
even there, the state makes no attempt to cover all or even a meaningful 
proportion of the costs associated with local immigration enforcement. 
Outsourcing like this seems to be precisely the kind of legislative 
distortion that state prohibitions on unfunded mandates were intended 
to cover, notwithstanding the creative ways that legislatures attempt to 
write around those constraints. Florida’s proposed law, for example, 
authorizes localities to seek reimbursement from the federal government 
and the detainees themselves.174 But there is little to suggest that these 
“revenue sources” are likely to “generate the amount of funds estimated 
to be sufficient to fund [the mandated] expenditure,” as the state 
                                                                                                                           
financial liability on local governments, and ultimately move us further from our foundational 
principles of federalism.”). 
 170. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510–11 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(noting that the federal government neither reimburses local governments when they 
comply with detainer requests nor indemnifies them for liability incurred because of 
Fourth Amendment violations); Cty. of Santa Clara, Civil Immigration Detainer Requests - 
Board Policy 3.54, at 1 (2011), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/scc/gov/CountyPolicies/ 
Board-Policy-3.54-Civil-Immigration-Detainer-Requests.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MJJ-X8CF] 
(requiring federal reimbursement of all costs before the County complies with ICE 
detainer requests); Cty. of Santa Clara, Summary of Proceedings/Minutes of Board of 
Supervisors Meeting, Oct. 18, 2011, at 4 (2011), http://sccgov.iqm2.com/Citizens/ 
FileOpen.aspx?Type=12&ID=1135&Inline=True [https://perma.cc/LL4D-M5E5] (noting 
that detainers are unlikely to be honored if dependent on federal reimbursement). 
 171. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1087 (2004) (explaining that local enforcement of immigration 
law has been critiqued for “divert[ing] resources from local policing priorities”). 
 172. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-59-101 (2018) (“Because the matters contained in 
this chapter have important statewide ramifications for compliance with and enforcement 
of federal immigration laws and for the welfare of all citizens in this state, these matters 
are of statewide concern.”). 
 173. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.0241 (2017); S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) 
(codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.055). 
 174. See H.B. 9, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
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constitution requires.175 Tennessee perhaps seeks to avoid the unfunded-
mandate problem altogether by prohibiting sanctuary policies but does 
not impose any specific mandates to participate in federal immigration 
enforcement.176 But given our discussion about how sanctuary 
prohibitions like the one in Tennessee operate as implicit mandates in 
practice,177 a court might be convinced to reject such an effort to 
circumvent the state’s unfunded mandate provision. 
Even in states without an explicit ban on unfunded mandates, 
accountability concerns loom large. One wonders whether states would 
be as eager as they are to enact anti-sanctuary legislation if they had to 
fund the additional costs themselves through state revenues—or if the 
practical effect of anti-sanctuary legislation is better understood as not 
only a conscription of local officials but also a conscription of local 
coffers. After all, courts have long recognized in the context of home 
rule that there is no “greater municipal concern than how a city’s tax 
dollars will be spent; nor anything which could be of less interest to 
taxpayers of other jurisdictions.”178 
3. Local Democracy. — Finally, state anti-sanctuary laws threaten the 
long-standing fundamentals of American-style local democracy. The 
threat here is not simply that states are repealing local sanctuary policies. 
Rather, it is that the specific manner in which anti-sanctuary laws seek to 
compel local participation in federal immigration enforcement increasingly 
impinges upon democratic discourse, local political representation, and 
local legislative agenda setting. This, in turn, may subject certain state anti-
sanctuary laws to claims based specifically on state constitutional 
guarantees of local representative democracy. 
Indeed, what is striking about the most recent wave of state anti-
sanctuary legislation is the extent to which it targets political speech, 
especially those laws that express dissenting views from the state legislature 
or executive authority.179 S.B. 4 in Texas prohibits local officials from 
“endors[ing]” a policy that “prohibits or materially limits the enforcement 
of immigration laws,” in addition to prohibiting the adoption or 
enforcement of such a policy.180 In Iowa, local officials are now prohibited 
                                                                                                                           
 175. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18. 
 176. See Tenn. Const. art. II, § 24 (“No law of general application shall impose 
increased expenditure requirements on cities or counties unless the General Assembly 
shall provide that the state share in the cost.”). 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 152–154. 
 178. Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 1002 (Cal. 1992). 
 179. The state attorney general is often tasked with prosecuting violations of state anti-
sanctuary laws. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.055 (2017) (“[The state] attorney general 
may file a petition for a writ of mandamus or apply for other appropriate equitable 
relief . . . to compel the entity or department that is suspected of violating Section 
752.053[’s immigration enforcement law] to comply with that section.”). 
 180. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1)). 
As the district court noted in City of El Cenizo, the author of S.B. 4 suggested that “a ‘wink, wink’ 
or a nod could be construed as an endorsement,” as could “simply standing in support of a 
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from undertaking “any . . . action” that “discourages the enforcement of 
immigration laws.”181 A Florida bill, which ultimately died in the State 
Senate, sought to punish local officials with suspension or removal from 
office for voting either for a local sanctuary policy or against its repeal—
even if such a vote would have been purely expressive in nature and 
would not actually have led to the implementation of a sanctuary 
policy.182 
Understandably, these states are trying to preclude any effort by 
localities to circumvent their anti-sanctuary legislation. But in doing so, 
they go beyond the local sanctuary policies themselves. They target the 
views of local officials and attempt to foreclose the various means by 
which those views might be expressed. 
The personal nature of the penalties for violating state anti-sanctuary 
laws adds another layer to this attack on local democratic discourse. We 
ordinarily believe that local officials are elected to give voice to the views 
of their constituents and act upon them if possible. But by targeting local 
officials personally, the contemporary wave of state anti-sanctuary laws 
threatens to undermine this traditional connection between local officials 
and the people they are elected to represent. A city council member may, 
for example, refuse to speak out against a state’s immigration mandate not 
because that reflects the views of her constituents but because she fears her 
removal from office or other personal sanctions. This reluctance may 
serve the interest of the state, which seeks to ensure that only its view is 
expressed. The result, however, is to undermine the traditional role of 
local officials as democratic representatives of their constituents in 
enacting legislation and political advocacy. 
Moreover, the broad and punitive scope of contemporary anti-
sanctuary laws may even have an effect on local policy agendas outside of 
the immigration context, like an inclusive zoning policy that makes 
affordable housing available to city residents irrespective of immigration 
status. The issue is not whether a court will eventually hold that such a 
policy “materially limits the enforcement of immigration law,” as 
prohibited by anti-sanctuary laws like S.B. 4.183 It is whether local 
                                                                                                                           
group such as MALDEF or LULAC when that group is making a public statement against 
[S.B.] 4 or in support of the type of local policies that it bans.” City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 
264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 781 (W.D. Tex. 2017). The State argued that the “endorse” language 
should be interpreted narrowly to mean “sanction” and be limited to official speech. See 
City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 182 (5th Cir. 2018). But whether the state 
intended to exercise its discretion in that manner does not change the fact that the state 
legislature included the word “endorse” alongside and in addition to “adopt” and 
“enforce.” 
 181. S. F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codified at Iowa Code 
§ 825.4). 
 182. See H.B. 9, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 908.303(4) (Fla. 2018). 
 183. Tex. S.B. 4. 
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policymakers—regardless of their beliefs on sanctuary—would be willing 
to take the risk. 
There are some signs that these democratic concerns are being 
addressed in federal anti-sanctuary litigation. As noted earlier, the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s injunction against the “endorsement” 
ban in S.B. 4, at least with respect to elected officials.184 Nevertheless, it is 
telling that the reason elected officials are protected is not any immunity 
they might enjoy as democratic representatives but rather their First 
Amendment right to free speech in their private capacity.185 The effect 
here is to protect local representatives engaged in democratic discourse 
and debate. But given the framing of the underlying federal litigation, 
and the court’s reluctance to separate the locality from the state in its 
federal constitutional analysis,186 the effect of Texas’s law on local 
democracy is understood as irrelevant. 
In comparison, a challenge founded specifically on localism 
arguments may prove just as effective and more to the point. Indeed, as 
punitive preemption statutes have become more popular, there have 
already been some efforts to translate these democratic concerns into 
concrete localism claims. In Florida Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee,  for 
example, the city, joined by several amici, challenged a Florida law that 
subjects local officials to personal fines and removal from office for their 
vote on gun-related measures as an unconstitutional extension of the 
state’s traditional powers of preemption.187 They argued that the personal-
sanctions provision violates the legislative immunity of local representatives 
and that such immunity is an “inherent component of the constitutional 
guarantee of local representative democracy” contained in the Florida 
constitution.188 The district court chose not to address the city’s local-
                                                                                                                           
 184. City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 184–85. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Indeed, this is why the court refused to extend the “endorsement” injunction to 
nonelected officials. Although the court found that the issue was not properly before it, it 
noted that the speech of nonelected officials would likely be governed by the government 
speech doctrine, which in this case would mean that the state can compel such local 
officials to speak in a particular way because they are simply mouthpieces of the state. Id. 
The Fifth Circuit did not make the same distinction that the district court did in arguing 
that the local officials targeted by S.B. 4 are not state employees but rather elected local 
officials. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 779 (W.D. Tex. 2017). 
 187. No. 2014-CA-1168, 2015 WL 13612020, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2015), aff’d, 212 
So. 3d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
 188. Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Florida League of Cities, in Support of Appellees/Cross-
Appellants at 4, Florida Carry, Inc., 212 So. 3d 452 (No. 1D15-5520), http://defendlocal.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/LeagueOfCitiesAmicus.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAD3-UAYF]; see also 
Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief at 11–12, Florida Carry, Inc., No. 
2014-CA-1168, 2014 WL 12740968; Brief of the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Cross-Appellants at 13–14, Florida Carry, Inc., 212 So. 3d 
452 (No. 1D15-5520), http://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-
05-16-Florida-Carry-v.-City-of-Tallahassee-Law-Center-Amicus-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VVZ-
25BR]. 
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democracy claim, finding that the individual defendants were not subject 
to the sanction provisions and thus did not present a case or controversy 
with respect to that claim.189 But the city’s argument in Florida Carry 
suggests that there is more at stake when it comes to personal sanctions 
against legislative activities than the free speech rights of local officials in 
their private capacities. 
C. Addressing the Limits of Localism 
Thus far, we have argued that localism provides not only an important 
doctrinal lens for assessing state anti-sanctuary laws but also legal claims 
that might be used to counter their expansion and proliferation. We 
admit, however, that the conventional view is far more pessimistic about 
localism’s prospects, especially in the context of immigration. It is 
commonly assumed that localities, as “creatures” of the state, remain 
uniquely vulnerable to state preemption despite the many ways in which 
local autonomy has expanded.190 At the same time, because immigration 
is widely believed to be a national issue, it is difficult for many to see how 
a given local sanctuary policy might be considered a “local affair,” and 
thus within the sphere of authority in which local power is presumed to 
be strongest in relation to the state.191 We address these and other 
concerns here. Notably, we do so by highlighting the unique structure of 
state anti-sanctuary laws and how it differs from not only the structure of 
other state preemption statutes but also that of traditional immigration 
regulations more generally. 
As an initial matter, standard state preemption analysis is likely not 
the right framework for assessing state anti-sanctuary laws. Traditionally, 
when a state preempts, it replaces a local regulation with a state regulation; 
the goal is to mandate a uniform set of laws with respect to how private 
activity is regulated and what kind of individual rights are recognized. 
This is what states have done in repealing local legislation on economic 
rights (minimum wage and paid family leave), civil rights (antidis-
crimination for members of the LGBTQ community), and environmental 
policies (fracking and plastic bags).192 But while state anti-sanctuary laws 
tend to be discussed today as part of this broader state preemption 
wave,193 they are unique insofar as they seek to compel specific local 
                                                                                                                           
 189. Florida Carry, Inc., 2015 WL 13612020, at *6. The Florida District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s finding on this score. Florida Carry, Inc., 212 So. 3d at 466. 
 190. See supra section I.C. 
 191. See Su, The States of Immigration, supra note 43, at 1372 (describing how 
focusing on public benefits and the fiscal cost of immigration could provide a lens 
through which “immigration could be sensibly understood as a matter of ‘states’ rights’”). 
 192. See, e.g., Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 1999–2002 (collecting 
examples of these and other areas of state preemption). 
 193. See id. at 2004–05 (citing anti-sanctuary legislation in Florida, Texas, and Arizona 
as examples of efforts to impose penalties on local governments for adopting laws subject 
to preemption). 
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governmental action, as opposed to simply displacing local regulations of 
residents and businesses. 
In the federalism context, the Supreme Court draws precisely this 
distinction in holding that the federal government’s power to preempt 
state legislation by regulating citizens directly does not encompass the 
power to commandeer the states.194 Now, it may be that many states, 
including those with broad home-rule protections, do allow for state 
commandeering. But as we showed, whether the state can assume direct 
control of local officials is separate from whether it can preempt local 
laws or policies. The fact is, unlike general preemption, few state courts 
have directly addressed this issue as a matter of local–state relations, 
largely because there have been few state laws in recent history that aim 
to do what state anti-sanctuary laws are now attempting. 
Second, even if one believes immigration enforcement is a uniquely 
national issue that should be immune from local interference,195 such an 
understanding does nothing to resolve the issue of whether states should 
have special preeminence over localities in immigration matters. To be 
sure, local sanctuary policies may now be a central issue in the national 
debate over immigration. Moreover, a court might reason that because 
states rank higher in the federal hierarchy than localities, immigration is 
properly regarded as a statewide issue.196 But under the plenary power 
doctrine, states should have no more standing with respect to immigration 
than localities. And unlike local immigration regulations, sanctuary 
policies are largely efforts by localities to remain in their traditional 
sphere of local authority and distance themselves from the exclusive 
                                                                                                                           
 194. See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476–77 (2018); see also supra note 
53 and accompanying text. 
 195. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581, 604 (1889) (“While under our constitution and form of government the great mass of 
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California Supreme Court in the early twentieth century. In City of Pasadena v. Charleville, the 
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noncitizens, both of which were prohibited by state law. 10 P.2d 745, 746 (Cal. 1932). The 
resulting split decision illustrates the conceptual distortion of immigration. With respect to 
the prevailing-wage requirement, the court held that no issue was more local than how a city 
decides to spend its own money. Thus, under the home-rule immunity granted by the 
California Constitution, state law must give way to local discretion. Presumably the same 
reasoning should apply to the city’s decision to use its own money to hire contractors that 
employed immigrants. But here, the court abruptly reversed course. In seeming 
contradiction with its earlier statements, the court argued here that “[a]ll public works and 
all public property in the state in a broad sense belong to all of the people of the state” and 
thus are statewide concerns, even when the public property in question is owned by a home-
rule city. Id. at 750. Thus, unlike the prevailing-wage requirement, the employment of 
noncitizens on public works is not a local matter and is subject to preemption by state law. 
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federal responsibility over immigration enforcement. These policies are 
often enacted in response to uniquely local concerns: trust between 
police and residents, the efficient allocation of scarce municipal resources, 
and the need to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of local 
officials.197 Again, a state court may find some distinctive state interest 
that outweighs the local concerns at stake with respect to sanctuary. But 
in our view, that is also a localism consideration separate from the legal 
view that immigration, as a whole, is a national issue. 
Third, the fact that localism claims in general—and specific claims 
like those suggested above—tend to be untested and undeveloped 
should be reasons for considering rather than dismissing them. 
Localities’ historical turn to federal constitutional claims makes sense: 
Such arguments have a proven track record on immigration matters, and 
federal courts have largely been receptive to their use to oppose federal 
anti-sanctuary policies.198 But because state anti-sanctuary laws are 
shifting the legal terrain for battles over local sanctuary policies, there is 
arguably no better time to begin cultivating localism claims as an 
alternative. Indeed, if the result from the Texas S.B. 4 litigation is any 
indication, pressing immigration localism arguments might be necessary. 
Finally, just as cities draw upon legal victories by other cities in 
bolstering their own litigation efforts against federal anti-sanctuary 
policies, a successful localism claim in one state might support legal 
challenges elsewhere. Despite the differences in localism structure from 
state to state, there are also many commonalities around which an 
interlocal litigation strategy can be built. Given the fact that localities 
today are facing state-level regulation on a host of policy matters, 
immigration localism claims can bolster the move to protect local 
policymaking more generally. 
All of this suggests the need to take localism seriously in confronting 
state anti-sanctuary laws. Even if Congress were to pass a law granting 
localities the discretion to choose whether and to what extent they wish 
to participate in federal immigration enforcement,199 it is unclear that 
such a law could insulate localities from state laws mandating their 
involvement. Given that localities draw all their power and authority from 
                                                                                                                           
 197. See, e.g., Gurbir S. Grewal, Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Law Enforcement 
Directive No. 2018-6, at 1 (2018), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ 
ag-directive-2018-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VTP-9BXH] (explaining that the state’s new 
directive clarifies the role of state law enforcement officers in enforcing “state criminal law” 
and not “federal civil immigration law”). 
 198. See supra section I.A (examining local governments’ successful litigation against 
the federal government’s anti-sanctuary policies). 
 199. In the litigation against S.B. 4 in Texas, this was precisely the construction that 
supporters of local sanctuary policies sought to apply to existing federal law—namely 
section 287(g). See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 180 (5th Cir. 2018). Ironically, 
it is also what supporters of 287(g) agreements might have argued against the provision of 
California’s S.B. 54 (the “state sanctuary law”) that prohibits localities from entering into 
287(g) agreements. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 7284.6(a)(1)(F)–(G) (2018). 
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the state, it is doubtful that the federal government could directly grant 
localities discretion, or otherwise interfere with how states regulate that 
discretion, without running afoul of the federal anticommandeering 
doctrine or state sovereignty principles more generally.200 What this 
means is that unless the federal government is willing to deny all state 
and local involvement in federal immigration enforcement—an 
extremely unlikely scenario—cities and localities cannot depend on the 
federal government to protect local sanctuary policies from state laws 
through federal preemption. At some point, if states persist in pursuing 
anti-sanctuary policies, localities must turn to their own legal standing 
and the localism structure of their state. 
III. THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF IMMIGRATION LOCALISM 
Even if a move toward considering local autonomy might be 
necessitated by contemporary state anti-sanctuary laws, fully embracing a 
localist stance means asking whether that litigation game is worth the 
candle. This Part argues that it is and guardedly advances the normative case 
for immigration localism, at least as it pertains to participation in the 
federal enforcement regime. 
Section III.A below argues that a localist reorientation of immigration 
enforcement offers a better way to think about immigration policymaking 
and enforcement today. Defending sanctuary cities qua cities renders a 
more accurate description of the enforcement regime, allowing for 
immigration law theory to more fully account for the statutory and 
practical importance of municipal governments, local agencies, and city 
officials. In addition, acknowledging the significance of municipal 
empowerment on immigration facilitates the opportunity for local civic 
participation by communities to more effectively engage and influence 
the national discourse on immigration policy. 
                                                                                                                           
 200. The Supreme Court touched on some of these concerns in Nixon v. Missouri 
Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 129 (2004). The Court held that in enacting a law protecting 
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uniformity by empowering localities directly. But see Lawrence Cty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. 
Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 261 (1985) (holding that a federal law providing for federal 
payments to a county that can be used for “‘any’ governmental purpose” preempted a 
state law specifying their particular use, but not discussing localism or anticommandeering 
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874 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:837 
Yet, as we acknowledge in section III.B, localism is perilous as well. 
As Nestor Davidson argues in a recent essay, although localism might 
serve many progressive ends, it can also be used as a tool of exclusion, 
with local resources marshaled toward reinforcing social and economic 
inequalities.201 This is evident with respect to how immigrants fare in 
local communities more generally,202 and it might also be the case for 
immigration enforcement. We consider two such risks that might worry 
immigrant advocates and other progressives on immigration enforcement 
issues: Immigration localism (1) might encourage the expansion of local 
anti-immigrant policies and (2) might undermine state sanctuary efforts 
by providing legal heft to the defense of anti-sanctuary cities. Both are 
worrying possibilities; however, localism, on the balance, will better serve 
immigrant interests in the long run. 
A. The Promise of Immigration Localism 
Localism advances at least two normatively desirable ends. First, 
focusing on the city qua city produces a better descriptive account of how 
the current immigration enforcement regime operates. In so doing, it 
decentralizes the role the federal government has played in immigration 
theory and doctrine. Second, immigration localism promotes civic 
participation and engagement on immigration enforcement by allowing 
local communities to calibrate that enforcement through the democratic 
process. 
1. Localism as a Descriptive and Theoretical Account. — A focus on local 
authority provides courts and policymakers with a more accurate 
accounting of what is actually at stake in the current fights over sanctuary 
and highlights the decentralized nature of the immigration enforcement 
regime on the ground. Indeed, localism may be precisely the kind of 
theoretical framework that we need today, not only to think through the 
current state of immigration regulations but also to wean us from an 
oversized judicial and theoretical reliance on federal sovereignty as the 
cornerstone of immigration law. 
While immigration is a pressing national issue, turning our legal 
gaze toward localism calls attention to the role of local governments in 
our enforcement system, a role that is increasingly prominent in the 
construction and execution of federal enforcement policies. In recent 
decades, federal immigration enforcement has become more and more 
                                                                                                                           
 201. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 34, at 977. 
 202. See Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, 47 Hous. L. Rev. 
367, 370 (2010) [hereinafter Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation] 
(“[T]he legal structure responsible for the fragmentation of our lived environment into 
segregated neighborhoods and differentiated communities can be understood as a 
second-order immigration regulation.”); see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan, The New Immigration Federalism 81 (2015) (showing that smaller-size 
cities are more likely to propose or pass restrictionist immigration laws than more 
populous cities). 
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local.203 Enforcement activities once largely limited to the borders are 
now pervasive in the country’s interior.204 Regulations that once centered 
on criteria for admission and removal are increasingly intertwined with 
traditional spheres of state and local control, including employment,205 
housing,206 and social services.207 
Anti-sanctuary proponents often complain that cities and other 
localities are intruding upon the federal government’s plenary power 
over immigration in refusing to comply with federal policy on immigration 
enforcement. Yet the increased local influence on immigration has 
evolved precisely because federal immigration enforcement has become 
reliant on local participation. Since the early 2000s, nearly all federal 
enforcement innovations have revolved around a direct federal–local 
connection, in most cases bypassing the state entirely.208 The Secure 
Communities Program leverages noncitizens’ interactions with local 
police officers;209 detainer notices and hold requests are sent directly 
from federal officials to local sheriffs’ departments;210 jail-access policies 
for ICE are negotiated directly with city- and county-level officials;211 and 
                                                                                                                           
 203. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration 
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819, 
1850–52 (2011) (discussing ways in which state and local governments have increasingly 
enforced immigration law). 
 204. As just one example, consider the expansion of expedited removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012). Once limited to aliens arriving at a land border, executive and 
administrative rule changes over the past two decades have steadily increased its 
application to noncitizens found within 100 miles of the land border, then to within 100 
miles of both land and maritime borders, and now to possibly anywhere in the country. 
See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877-01 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
 205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012) (obligating employers to check work eligibility of 
employees, and penalizing employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers); 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2019) (setting forth classes of noncitizens that are eligible for 
employment in the United States). 
 206. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1436a(a)(1) (2012) (providing housing assistance to 
noncitizens who are legal permanent residents). 
 207. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (defining who constitutes a “qualified alien” for purposes 
of eligibility for certain federal, state, and local public benefits). 
 208. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 
1070, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1749, 1787–88 (2011) (discussing the federal–local immigration 
relationship). 
 209. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Secure Communities: A Comprehensive 
Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens 1 (2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ 
secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3ZK-WW6W] 
(explaining the expanded federal–local relationship in enforcing immigration law). 
 210. See Lasch et al., supra note 21, at 1733–34 (discussing detainer requests that the 
federal government sends to local officials). 
 211. See e.g., Brenda Gazzar, Less Cooperation with ICE? LA County’s Sheriff Oversight 
Panel Is Considering It, L.A. Daily News (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.dailynews.com/2018/ 
01/25/la-county-sheriff-overpanel-wants-your-input-on-curbing-cooperation-with-ice/ [https:// 
perma.cc/T5YJ-PQHU] (explaining that local leaders are deciding whether to limit ICE’s access 
to county jails). 
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section 287(g) agreements are mostly signed between municipal entities 
and the federal government.212 
In turn, as a practical matter, this entanglement between federal and 
local spheres provides local officials with more influence over how 
federal enforcement is carried out.213 The federal government and a 
growing number of states now criticize sanctuary localities for obstructing 
federal immigration enforcement.214 But the goal of these attacks, both 
legal and political, is not to force localities to get out of the way so that 
federal agents can work unimpeded. Rather, it is to compel their 
participation, so that the federal enforcement regime can operate more 
cheaply and aggressively. Indeed, the federal government’s legal argument 
as to why state and local sanctuary policies must be voided rests on a 
background expectation of local participation in immigration 
enforcement.215 As such, any theory of immigration law that relies only on 
the talismanic invocation of federal or state sovereign status ignores the 
underlying dependence of the immigration enforcement structure on 
local governments, resources, and personnel. Advancing localist arguments, 
then, helps foreground this reality, forcing courts, the federal 
government, and anti-sanctuary states to forthrightly acknowledge and 
account for this on-the-ground reality. 
Recognizing the integration of localities into core immigration 
enforcement functions necessarily forces a concomitant decentralization 
of the federal government’s role in dictating immigration rules. As one 
of the authors of this Essay and others have argued in prior work, one of 
the cornerstones of “immigration exceptionalism” has been the 
categorical power accorded immigration actions by the federal 
government, both from Congress and the executive.216 The federal 
courts’ reliance on a broad federal power over immigration policy has 
immunized explicitly discriminatory immigration policies, and 
enforcement tactics, from searching judicial review.217 The current debate 
                                                                                                                           
 212. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (explaining section 287(g) agreements between the federal 
and municipal governments). 
 213. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
Yale L.J. 1256, 1265–71 (2009) (discussing the “power of the servant” to influence federal 
policy). 
 214. See supra Part I (discussing federal and state governments’ criticism of sanctuary 
cities’ resistance to federal immigration enforcement). 
 215. See Sanctuary Cities E.O., supra note 47, § 8 (describing the level of state and 
local participation needed in order for the federal government to have an effective 
immigration enforcement policy). 
 216. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 594–99. 
 217. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408, 2423 (2018) (holding that the INA 
“exudes deference to the President in every clause” and thus would allow the suspension 
of entry for people from certain countries without contravening the Establishment 
Clause); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“At the 
outset we wish to point out that an alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so 
under any claim of right. . . . Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as 
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over state anti-sanctuary laws focuses on similar attributes of sovereignty, 
with the constitutional recognition of plenary state authority over 
localities quashing dissent over immigration enforcement at the 
municipal level. 
Accordingly, as localism shifts judicial and public focus to the now-
indispensable role of local agencies and agents in immigration enforcement, 
it contributes to a general de-emphasis on the role that constitutionally 
recognized sovereign status should play in immigration regulation. 
Although we concede that the federal government is now, will likely 
always be, and perhaps should be a powerful voice in setting immigration 
policy, this Essay’s defense of local autonomy is part of a larger 
theoretical move toward recalibrating that centralized authority. In prior 
work, two of us have noted that the proliferation of nongovernmental 
sanctuaries, in the form of universities, workplaces, religious organizations, 
and community groups, is already exerting pressure on that conventional 
view—repeated almost reflexively in judicial opinions and litigation 
briefs—that immigration enforcement is a purely federal concern.218 
At times, judicial and political emphasis on an outsized role for the 
central government is justified by the alleged need for “uniformity” in 
immigration law.219 Even if uniformity in immigration enforcement is 
prized, however, it is worth asking whether it can be achieved once 
thousands of localities, enforcement agencies, and officers are made 
integral parts of that system. At the very least, it has to be acknowledged 
that a desire for uniformity is in tension with a desire to implement 
immigration enforcement by conscripting and cajoling hundreds of 
unconnected agencies and officials, outside of DHS control, each 
answering to different constituencies, none of which were created for the 
purpose of immigration enforcement. The greater the reliance on this 
set of decentralized and semiautonomous actors, the less the probability 
of achieving uniformity. Thus, the very idea of uniformity as a 
jurisprudential conceit is in tension with the structure and practice of 
federal immigration enforcement law, which has actively sought to rely 
on localities to achieve its enforcement vision. 
A localist reorientation of immigration enforcement, then, creates 
space for recognition of, and emphasis on, the intricate relationships 
                                                                                                                           
the United States shall prescribe.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion 
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–06 (1889) (holding the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
constitutional under the federal government’s broad powers to secure the nation against 
insurrection). 
 218. See Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 25, at 1232–38, 
1242–49; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Opinion, The Case for Non-
Governmental Sanctuary, L.A. Times (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-
ed/la-oe-gulasekaram-villazor-immigrant-sanctuary-network-20180405-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
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 219. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 548–49 
(5th Cir. 2013) (noting cases that discussed the need for uniformity in immigration law 
enforcement). 
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between the federal enforcement scheme and local officers and 
institutions. This reorientation also allows judicial consideration of why 
local opinions matter. Once localities are made indispensable partners in 
the enforcement regime, any drive towards uniformity must be balanced 
against the tradeoffs inherent in genuine, uncoerced participation by 
local constituencies. 
Even if the federal government and anti-sanctuary states have the 
legal authority to displace local discretion, translating that authority into 
practice remains difficult. Anti-sanctuary laws can go only so far to 
compel assistance, much less enthusiastic participation. Local elected 
officials have little incentive to carry out state or federal policies that are 
unpopular among their constituents. Moreover, the administrative 
independence of local governments means that neither the state nor 
federal government is well situated to ensure compliance through 
monitoring. These limitations are likely why the trend among state anti-
sanctuary laws has been to increase penalties and target informal norms. 
But as scholars of intergovernmental relations often observe, 
negotiations and partnerships are often more effective than censure and 
sanctions in recruiting meaningful assistance.220 Acknowledging the role 
of local governments, and engaging with them as potential partners, may 
ultimately be the most effective way to carry out immigration enforcement. 
In this regard, it is worth remembering that sanctuary city policies 
have generally not withheld all local assistance. They often allow for local 
immigration enforcement in circumstances where local interests 
converge with those of federal authorities. Chicago, for example, has 
zealously defended its sanctuary policy against the federal government, 
even scoring major victories that threaten to undermine federal anti-
sanctuary efforts far into the future.221 But Chicago’s sanctuary policy 
exempts many individual cases, such as when an individual has an 
outstanding criminal warrant, has been charged with or convicted of a 
felony, or has been identified as a gang member.222 In fact, some counties 
that now refuse to honor immigration detainers do not consider 
themselves opponents of federal immigration enforcement. Rather, their 
concern is with the refusal of the federal government to compensate 
them for the cost that they are being asked to incur or to indemnify them 
for the mistakes that the federal government makes. These examples 
reveal that there is room for negotiation and finding common interest. 
                                                                                                                           
 220. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, How to Conduct Effective Transnational Negotiations 
Between Nations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Business Firms, 45 Wash. U. J.L. & 
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Tilting our legal and theoretical gaze toward localism begins to allow for 
these negotiations and calibrations instead of the all-or-nothing stakes of 
either federal plenary power or state-centered federalism. 
2. The Role of Local Civic Engagement in Immigration Discourse. — 
Localism also calls attention to the democratic process through which 
sanctuary and other immigration-related policies are made. While it 
might also be true that localism supports certain types of decisions (that 
is, integrationist over restrictionist policies), that is not our point here. 
Rather, it is that there may be some qualitative differences in how policies 
are made at the local level—tailored, personal, accessible—that are worth 
defending on their own, even in the context of immigration. More 
broadly, local decisionmaking on immigration enforcement allows 
communities to more efficiently and effectively participate in the national 
discourse over immigration. Even if only Congress and the President 
retain authority over large questions of admissions, removals, and visa 
allocations, local engagement on enforcement at the agency, city, and 
county levels provides an accessible democratic vehicle for community 
residents to express their approval or disapproval of those national 
policies. 
Somewhat ironically, both the federal government and the states 
rationalize anti-sanctuary and other interior enforcement strategies as 
beneficial to the local communities that they are targeting. They argue 
that zealous immigration enforcement makes communities safer and 
promotes the economic well-being of their residents.223 To the extent 
that any of these community-well-being-minded claims are in fact 
genuine,224 they raise the question of who is in the best position to make 
that decision—the communities themselves or state and federal govern-
ments. It is, after all, local coffers that will likely have to bear the 
personnel and facilities costs of choosing to aid in enforcement. And if, 
in fact, sanctuary policies lead to increased crime and public safety 
threats, we might presume that local constituencies would be inclined to 
reject them or at least temper their noncooperation stances. 
To the extent national decisionmaking on immigration focuses on 
different concerns than does local policymaking, only localism provides a 
conceptual and political space for those considerations. National 
debates, by necessity, rely on aggregate statistics or generalized anecdotes 
to present competing narratives about the effect of immigration on the 
                                                                                                                           
 223. See, e.g., Marie Solis, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities are ‘Crime-Infested’—Research 
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country. These broad narratives form the basis for the partisan divide 
that defines immigration negotiations at the federal level. When the scale 
is reduced, however, the details and diversity of immigration’s impacts on 
different communities are revealed. In some instances, the effect of 
particular immigrant groups on discrete industries in specific 
communities forms the basis for decisionmaking.225 
It is also almost certainly true that at the local level, immigrants are 
less likely to be defined entirely by their legal status under federal 
immigration law.226 Instead, they are more likely to be known as 
neighbors, colleagues, schoolmates, friends.227 Human interactions at the 
community level, of course, do not necessarily generate good 
impressions. Local controversy over immigration is as much spurred by 
“unneighborly” conduct—overcrowded houses, unkempt lawns, loud 
music—as concern about the security of our national borders.228 But it is 
also through these personal interactions that the divide between 
immigrant and native, old-timers and newcomers is bridged. 
We may celebrate the cosmopolitan culture in American cities for its 
tolerance and acceptance of immigrants. But this culture did not arise 
fully formed with the establishment of these cities; rather, it reflects a 
long, tortured, and ongoing process by which different groups of 
people—immigrant and otherwise—have interacted with one another at 
the neighborhood level. Even if smaller towns are more likely to be 
inhospitable to foreigners, and thus favor immigration enforcement at 
the national level, they are also often just as quick to rally against such 
enforcement when federal authorities come not for nameless “illegals” 
                                                                                                                           
 225. See Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 202, at 73–82 (showing that 
although GOP-majority localities are much more likely to enact restrictionist measures, the 
existence of large agricultural business interests in GOP-controlled areas is a consistent 
factor in disincentivizing the proposal, or defeating the enactment, of restrictionist local 
laws). 
 226. Cf. Megan Brenan, Record-High 75% of Americans Say Immigration Is Good 
Thing, Gallup (June 21, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/235793/record-high-
americans-say-immigration-good-thing.aspx [https://perma.cc/3QVF-ZFR2] (“A record-
high 75% of Americans, including majorities of all party groups, think immigration is a 
good thing for the U.S.—up slightly from 71% last year. Just 19% of the public considers 
immigration a bad thing.”). 
 227. Cf. Nina Shapiro, A Washington County that Went for Trump Is Shaken as Immigrant 
Neighbors Start Disappearing, Seattle Times (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/ 
seattle-news/northwest/fear-regrets-as-pacific-county-residents-go-missing-amid-immigration- 
crackdown-police-chief-neighbors-kind-of-in-shock-after-immigration-arrests-in-pacific-county- 
immigration-crack/ [https://perma.cc/AVK6-RYR3] (describing a small Washington town 
where the conservative police chief lamented “neighbors just snatched” from their midst). 
 228. See, e.g., Thomas J. Vicino, Suburban Crossroads: The Fight for Local Control of 
Immigration Policy 68–69, 73–74 (2012) (describing the town of Farmers Branch, whose 
city council targeted immigration policy as a reason for the small community’s continued 
decline); Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, supra note 202, at 368–69, 
423–34 (“The intimate, local context where the effect of immigration is the most 
immediate and transparent . . . not only informs, but profoundly shapes how the issue and 
regulation of immigration is perceived.”). 
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but rather for Carlos,229 or Armando,230 or Marcos231—residents and 
members of their community. If national politics is about what happens to 
those people “out there,” local politics opens the opportunity to consider 
how policies affect those who are “here.” 
The inevitability of interaction between nationals and immigrants 
at the local level makes localities potential sites of immigrant integration.232 
Local spaces and institutions—schools, parks, agencies, neighborhoods—
are where all residents, regardless of immigration status, encounter each 
other on a face-to-face basis. By necessity, noncitizens and citizens must 
mobilize and determine municipal policies. This dynamic, of course, is 
not new. Since the earliest waves of immigration, the political assimilation 
of immigrants in America has started at the local level. Immigrants were 
an integral part of the urban political machines that dominated local 
politics in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, through which they secured 
middle-class jobs in city government and eventually became leading 
figures in party politics. If the Irish of the nineteenth century ultimately 
fared better than the Chinese, it was in part because the Chinese were 
unable to naturalize, which foreclosed them from exercising political 
power even if they were able to effectively litigate against the laws 
targeting them. In the same vein, the partisan backlash against 
immigrants today also appears to be fueled less by the actual numbers of 
immigrants arriving here from Latin America, which has been falling in 
recent years, than by the perceived threat to an established racial and 
political order.233 This seems to be especially true in the immigrant-
receiving cities in traditionally “red states.” It is no surprise then that some 
of the most aggressive state anti-sanctuary efforts are centered in states 
like Texas and Florida, with large immigrant-receiving and immigrant-
integrative cities. 
Perhaps most importantly, regardless of whether local politics is 
based on uniquely local or personal considerations, it is almost certain to 
be more accessible than either state or federal decisionmaking. In addition 
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to providing a vehicle for immigrant integration and mobilization, local 
institutional debates on whether and how to enact sanctuary policies are 
part of a larger national conversation. While federal enforcement 
policies have effectively made national enforcement decisions into local 
concerns, the converse is also true. Local sanctuary policies are one 
vehicle—an especially effective one—that local constituencies can use to 
enter the national conversation over the proper level of immigration 
enforcement specifically and the legitimacy of federal immigration 
policies more generally. In other words, as the national immigration 
enforcement regime becomes inextricably local, local preferences 
inexorably calibrate national policymaking. 
If local governments are an important platform for immigrants to 
become a part of America’s political community and for all community 
members to engage in debates over immigration policy, then immigrant 
advocates and scholars should be highly concerned about the powers of 
local governments. They should be invested not just because local power 
is an important part of defending local sanctuary policies against the 
anti-sanctuary efforts but also because the scope of local power is 
important in determining the extent to which community attitudes on 
immigration and immigrants are meaningful in our national discourse. 
B. The Perils of Immigration Localism 
Undoubtedly, emphasizing local discretion is not without risks for 
immigrant advocates. Here, we discuss two obvious responses to our 
proposal that are likely to make immigrant advocates wary of this legal 
and theoretical shift: (1) Local discretion might lead to the proliferation 
of anti-sanctuary cities; and (2) a legal strategy bolstering local discretion 
will weaken powerful state-level sanctuary protections. 
1. Empowering Restrictionist Localities? — Thus far, this Essay has been 
organized around the dynamic of state hostility to local sanctuary laws. 
Accordingly, our focus on localist possibilities has underscored the need 
to maintain discretion at the local level so that cities and counties can 
retain the authority to resist conscription into federal enforcement 
programs. But there is no guarantee that localism will always result in 
immigrant-friendly or integrationist policies. Neither state-level preemption 
nor local authority inherently tracks political ideologies or partisan 
preferences. Thus, any structural power allocation or strong focus on 
localism risks inviting dozens of enforcement-minded jurisdictions to 
exercise their local discretion in a manner that recreates and amplifies 
the federal government’s enforcement regime. 
Indeed, the entrepreneurial and political forces that have successfully 
produced and proliferated state anti-sanctuary laws can and are being 
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directed at the local level.234 As Professor Richard Schragger points out, 
local policy fights have increasingly been waged by national policy 
groups.235 And, as media reports suggest, policy entrepreneurs have 
already found opportunities for pushing their vision at the local level.236 
Indeed, local restrictionism even extends into “blue” states like 
California, where the overall policy climate at the state level is 
integrationist, with a suite of state laws seeking to mitigate federal 
enforcement efforts. In that overwhelmingly immigrant-friendly state 
environment, cities like Los Alamitos, Huntington Beach, and Santa 
Clarita, along with counties like Orange County, have voiced their 
displeasure with state sanctuary laws and announced their willingness to 
bolster federal enforcement efforts.237 
                                                                                                                           
 234. Texas S.B. 4, for example, is similar to proposals in Iowa, Kansas, North Carolina, 
Florida, and other places with Republican-led state governments. See Kelly Cohen, State 
Lawmakers Move to Penalize ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ Wash. Examiner (Mar. 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/state-lawmakers-move-to-penalize-sanctuary-cities 
[https://perma.cc/C9XU-2AWG]. Moreover, this copycat legislation in several “red” states 
is not mere happenstance; rather it is strategized proliferation. See id. State lawmakers in 
Colorado actually initiated the recent state anti-sanctuary trend. See Joey Bunch, Colorado 
Springs Lawmaker’s Anti-Sanctuary City Bill Copied in Other States, Gazette (Colo. 
Springs) (Feb. 6, 2017), https://gazette.com/politics/colorado-springs-lawmaker-s-anti-sanctuary-
city-bill-copied-in/article_a86e1c04-e773-5084-b86a-a4ef541249fb.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7NHN-2R28]. In early 2017, Colorado state Republican Representative David Williams 
introduced the Colorado Politician Accountability Act, H.B. 17-1134, which would have 
created criminal and civil liability for local officials who implemented sanctuary-type 
policies. See Jesse Paul, Immigration Debate Flares Up in Colorado as Lawmakers Weigh Bill 
Targeting Sanctuary Cities, Denver Post (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/ 
02/22/immigration-colorado-sanctuary-cities/ [https://perma.cc/Z4GY-B25U]. Even as 
his proposal failed, state lawmakers in Ohio, Maine, and Alaska all introduced bills that 
were based on Williams’s effort. See Bunch, supra. 
 235. See Schragger, supra note 95, at 1226 (“That the city has become a highly salient 
site for national battles over everything from fracking to LGBT rights to plastic bags is 
obvious from the long list of preemptive state legislation . . . .”). 
 236. See id. at 1227 (using ALEC as an example of a national policy group that has 
influenced local policy fights by pushing a deregulatory agenda); see also Cindy Carcamo, 
Orange County May Take Stand Against State’s ‘Sanctuary’ Laws, L.A. Times (Mar. 27, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-anti-sanctuary-movement-in-oc-20180327-story.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that the Federation of Americans for 
Immigration Reform (FAIR), a national anti-immigration organization, had been 
“searching for California Cities and Counties” that were interested in filing briefs against 
California’s state sanctuary law, S.B. 54); Jazmine Ulloa, Sanctuary State Fight at Local 
Level May Be More Orchestrated than Organic, L.A. Times (May 2, 2018), http:// 
www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gop-opposition-sanctuary-state-law-20180502-story.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on the efforts by FAIR to combat 
California’s sanctuary law at the local level). 
 237. See, e.g., Nina Agrawal, Santa Clarita Opposes California’s ‘Sanctuary’ Law, the 
First City in L.A. County to Do So, L.A. Times (May 9, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/ 
local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-clarita-sanctuary-20180508-story.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (reporting on the opposition to California’s sanctuary law, S.B. 54, across 
various parts of California and the concomitant legal measures taken). 
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The use of local policies to aid, rather than oppose, federal 
enforcement efforts is not new. Between 2005 and 2012, several states and 
localities passed varied anti-immigrant laws that created new penalties 
based on immigration status.238 It was with these restrictionist examples 
in mind that immigration scholars and advocates invoked the civil rights–
era perception of local policymakers as uninformed, parochial, and 
prone to racist sentiments. These ideas fed into legal arguments against 
those local policies, which were almost uniformly struck down by federal 
courts, based on the preemption principles articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Arizona v. United States.239 In comparison, however, the current 
anti-sanctuary localism arguably seeks a more modest end, or at least one 
more within the traditional boundaries of local control, cleverly crafted 
in ways expressly contemplated and permitted by federal statute.240 
Because they might be better insulated from legal attack, contemporary 
local anti-sanctuary laws are ripe for proliferation by policy 
entrepreneurs and national organizations. 
Although it is possible that localism might encourage and empower 
an anti-sanctuary trend, that worry need not mean turning away from a 
localist strategy. First, it may be that localism will empower exclusionary 
and restrictionist cities, but one may yet believe that the benefits of 
localism will outweigh its potential to be parochial.241 Indeed, any 
structural doctrine might be used by interested political forces to achieve 
anti-immigrant ends. But that concern is no different for localism than it 
is for favoring the central government or a state-centered federalism. 
Much will always depend on who maintains political control over those 
jurisdictions. Given this Essay’s arguments about localized concerns with 
immigration enforcement and the need for civic participation and 
debate on those issues, a strong case can be made for lodging some 
                                                                                                                           
 238. In the prior era of state and local restrictionism, from 2005 through 2012, several 
cities—including Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Fremont, Nebraska; Valley Park, Missouri; 
Farmer’s Branch, Texas; and Escondido, California—attempted versions and variations of 
immigration enforcement laws that included rental ordinances, work-solicitation bans, 
language policies, and other forms of local resistance to the presence of undocumented and 
other noncitizens. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Hazleton Immigration 
Ordinance that Began with a Bang Goes Out with a Whimper, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Mar. 
28, 2014), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hazleton-immigration-ordinance-began-
bang-goes-out-whimper [https://perma.cc/78WJ-MUKX] (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to review two federal appellate court decisions that struck down controversial local 
immigration enforcement ordinances in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Farmers Branch, 
Texas). 
 239. 567 U.S. 387, 400–15 (2012) (applying preemption principles to each of the four 
challenged provisions of the Arizona immigration law at issue). 
 240. See supra section I.C (discussing the legal distinction between federal and state 
anti-sanctuary strategies). 
 241. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 34, at 979–80 (describing this 
view as “ecumenical” localism). 
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measure of discretion at the local level instead of elsewhere, despite the 
possibility of restrictionist outcomes.242 
Immigration enforcement might be a regulatory area that provides a 
hopeful outcome for immigrant advocates willing to live with the varied 
policy outcomes of an uncalibrated localist stance. Perhaps because of 
the visceral and immediate impact of local immigration policies, local 
enforcement policies tend to be more fluid and dynamic than those 
same policies at the state and national level. Local democracies do not 
always produce integrationist policies; however, local politics and policies 
also quickly change, either because of changing sentiment or changing 
demographics.  
Hazleton’s anti-immigrant ordinance may be the poster child for the 
parochial possibilities of local government involvement in immigration. 
But it is also an example of how quickly things can change.243 Lou 
Barletta, the former mayor of Hazleton and the lead proponent behind 
its anti-immigrant ordinance, departed for Congress in 2011—leaving his 
city with the cost of litigation and the settlement agreement after the 
ordinance was struck down by courts. In the meantime, however, 
Hazleton has become close to a majority-Latino city, and the community 
dynamics have evolved to become more tolerant and welcoming.244 A 
similar dynamic unfolded in Farmers Branch, Texas, where the 
population is now forty-five percent Latino.245 The Latino community’s 
political mobilization following the enactment of the city’s anti-
immigrant ordinance and its ensuing litigation has reshaped not only the 
face but also the tone of local politics.246 Then there is Riverside, New 
Jersey—the township that nobody remembers. Though it was one of the 
first communities to enact an anti-immigrant ordinance in 2006, it was 
also among the first to repeal such an ordinance—a little more than a 
year after its enactment—when the community concluded that the 
ordinance did more to hurt the community than it did to help.247 
                                                                                                                           
 242. See supra section III.A.2. 
 243. See Michael Matza, 10 Years After Immigration Dispute, Hazleton Is a Different 
Place, Inquirer (Phila.) (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160403_10_years_ 
after_immigration_disputes__Hazleton_is_a_different_place.html [https://perma.cc/GF5F-
XQHP] (explaining the evolution of public sentiment in Hazleton, following the invalidation 
of its anti-immigrant city ordinance). 
 244. See id. 
 245. Elvia Limon, Farmers Branch Still Trying to Move Forward from Shadow of 
Controversial Rental Ordinance, Dall. Morning News (Aug. 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/ 
news/farmers-branch/2016/08/26/farmers-branch-still-trying-move-forward-shadow- 
controversial-rentalordinance [https://perma.cc/Y396-WJCU]. 
 246. See id. (reporting on the lingering effects of the battle over Farmers Branch’s 
anti-immigration ordinance and how local politics have changed since). 
 247. See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 26, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/nyregion/26riverside.html (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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Second, if one is not willing to let local-government chips fall where 
they may, one might still embrace immigration localism if it can be 
calibrated to discourage or constrain restrictionist outcomes. On this 
view, antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles found in the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might be 
deployed to strike down the most egregious forms of local exclusion and 
restrictionism while preserving local sanctuary policies. To be sure, equal 
protection arguments have not been as successful in challenging local 
enforcement-minded policies against noncitizens.248 Even though courts 
sometimes employ a higher standard of review—strict scrutiny—when 
examining claims of state or local government discrimination against 
some noncitizens,249 state and local discrimination against undocumented 
immigrants does not receive that highest level of scrutiny.250 Moreover, 
litigants would face an uphill battle trying to convince a court that local 
enforcement laws discriminate on racial, ethnic, or national origin 
grounds. In challenging Arizona’s S.B. 1070, for example, the federal 
government was forced to concede in oral argument that it was not 
making a claim of racial discrimination.251 Indeed, the Court ultimately 
allowed S.B. 1070’s anti-sanctuary provision to go into effect.252 
Nevertheless, there is some hope that a more fully developed constitu-
tional jurisprudence regarding discrimination based on immigration 
status might be up to the task of differentiating between sanctuary and 
anti-sanctuary policies.253 Although the Supreme Court declined to find 
                                                                                                                           
 248. See Sofía D. Martos, Coded Codes: Discriminatory Intent, Modern Political 
Mobilization, and Local Immigration Ordinances, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2099, 2108, 2113 (2010) 
(explaining the difficulties of challenging immigration-related quality of life ordinances 
on equal protection grounds); Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At 
the Intersection of Property, Race and Citizenship, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 979, 994 (2010) 
(explaining how the Supreme Court, in deciding challenges to local property laws that 
restricted the property rights of noncitizens, ignored equal protection arguments). 
 249. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“[T]he Court’s decisions 
have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or 
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 250. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24, 230 (1982) (striking down a state law 
denying free public education to undocumented children because the state failed to show 
that the law “futher[ed] some substantial state interest,” but declining to exercise strict 
scrutiny review). Discrimination by the federal government against noncitizens, by 
contrast, receives the Court’s very deferential rational basis review. See Mathews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67, 81–84 (1976). 
 251. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 
(2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1425227. 
 252. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 414 –15. 
 253. As the Supreme Court recognized in Graham v. Richardson, immigrants “as a class 
are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority.’” 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); see also Takahashi v. Fish & 
Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948) (applying equal protection principles to 
noncitizens); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(arguing that a state law that “prohibit[ed] all aliens ineligible for American citizenship 
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that S.B. 1070’s section 2(B), the anti-sanctuary provision mandating that 
local officers inquire about immigration status upon a reasonable 
suspicion a suspect was in the country illegally, was preempted, the Court 
left open the possibility that the law may be challenged based on 
evidence of discriminatory application.254 And, eventually, after further 
litigation by advocacy groups,255 the Attorney General of Arizona settled, 
agreeing to substantially limit the enforcement of section 2(B) of S.B. 
1070.256  
In addition, as Professor Hiroshi Motomura has argued, courts might 
obliquely recognize evidence of racial and national origin discrimination 
in assessing local legislation.257 In Lozano v. Hazleton, for instance, 
plaintiffs challenged a local ordinance that required landlords to inquire 
about the immigration status of potential tenants.258 Although the district 
court did not rule for plaintiffs on their equal protection claim, it struck 
down the law on preemption grounds.259 According to Motomura, the 
evidence presented about discrimination may have subtly motivated the 
court’s decisionmaking.260 Moreover, relevant to the discussion of localism, 
advocates may look to state constitutional and statutory 
antidiscrimination protections to bolster claims against local anti-
sanctuary legislation.261 
                                                                                                                           
from acquiring, owning, occupying, enjoying, leasing or transferring agricultural land” 
violated equal protection principles and thus “deserve[d] constitutional condemnation”). 
 254. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415 (noting that the Court’s opinion “does not 
foreclose . . . constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes 
into effect”). 
 255. See Press Release, Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Arizona Attorney General Issues 
Opinion Establishing Constitutional Standards for Enforcement of Key SB 1070 
Provisions, Ending Lawsuit (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nilc.org/2016/09/15/arizona-
attorney-general-issues-opinion-establishing-constitutional-standards-enforcement-key-sb-
1070-provisions-ending-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/KAT2-QCBQ]. 
 256. See Joint Case Disposition at 1, Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV-10-01061-PHX-
SRB (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1297-
Joint-Case-Disposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9TC-MTLG]; Joint Case Disposition, exh. 
A at 2–5, Valle del Sol, No. CV-10-01061-PHX-SRB, https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/09/1297-1-Exhibit-A-Proposed-Attorney-General-Opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
N4GV-N3NM] (defining and limiting police officer conduct in relation to S.B. 1070 
section 2(B)). 
 257. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration 
Outside the Law, 59 Duke L.J. 1723, 1728–29 (2010) [hereinafter Motomura, The Rights 
of Others] (summarizing the ways in which unauthorized migrants may indirectly assert 
their rights to equal protection when challenging government decisions). 
 258. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484–85 (M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 259. Id. at 533, 542. 
 260. See Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 257, at 1742–46 (noting the 
substantial evidence on race and ethnicity and its potential link to the Lozano court’s 
preemption analysis). 
 261. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 34, at 964–74 (outlining examples of 
different states asserting authority to constrain local laws in a variety of policy areas). 
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Ultimately, antidiscrimination and equality norms may not currently 
provide an express and consistently reliable legal wedge to separate local 
sanctuary policies from anti-sanctuary ones. But that does not mean that 
advocates should give up seeking to normatively inflect structural power 
doctrines.262 Indeed, we see this as opportunity to develop new doctrinal 
approaches to equal protection in the immigration context.263 
2. Undermining State Sanctuary. — A second and related concern is 
that a localist strategy will bolster the legal case for local resistance to 
state-level sanctuary laws. This dynamic is currently playing out in litigation 
against California’s suite of sanctuary laws, including the California Values 
Act S.B. 54, sometimes referred to as the “state sanctuary law.”264 In 
March 2018, the Trump Administration filed a complaint against the 
State of California regarding its state sanctuary laws.265 Seeking injunctive 
relief enjoining the enforcement of these laws, the complaint specifically 
targets Assembly Bill 450 (A.B. 450),266 Assembly Bill 103 (A.B. 103),267 
and Senate Bill 54 (S.B. 54).268 These laws, according to the United 
                                                                                                                           
 262. See id. at 984 (“While there is no simple way to resolve the dilemma [of 
localism], normative considerations undergirding the vertical allocation of power in the 
states should be more directly confronted . . . .”). 
 263. For instance, one might examine ways that evidence of animus against 
unauthorized immigrants may be used to demonstrate subordination of a particular group 
in violation of equal protection principles under the “animus doctrine.” See, e.g., Alina 
Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the Origins of Crime-Based 
Deportation, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 171, 176 (2018). Or one may explore how even the 
rational basis approach may be used to strike down current discriminatory treatment of 
immigrants. See Katie Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1317, 1365-66 (2018) (arguing for the underappreciated potential role of rational basis to 
advance social movement goals). 
 264. S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 265. California Complaint, supra note 24, at 2–3. 
 266. A.B. 450, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). A.B. 450 prohibits private 
employers from voluntarily cooperating with federal officials who seek information 
relevant to immigration enforcement in places of employment. Id. § 1. Employers may not 
consent to an immigration agent to enter nonpublic areas of the workplace unless the 
agent provides a warrant. Id. § 2. The United States argues that this provision interferes 
with the enforcement of the INA and Immigration Reform and Control Act’s prohibition 
on working without authorization. California Complaint, supra note 24, at 7–9. 
 267. A.B. 103, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). AB 103 creates an inspection-
and-review process requiring the California Attorney General to investigate enforcement 
efforts of federal agents. Id. § 12. It permits an inspection of facilities and an examination 
of the due process provided to civil immigration detainees. Id. It allows access to detainees, 
officials, personnel, and records. Id. The United States argues this is an “improper, 
significant intrusion into federal enforcement of the immigration laws” and that California 
lacks any lawful interest in such investigatory efforts. California Complaint, supra note 24, 
at 10, 12–13. 
 268. Cal. S.B. 54. S.B. 54 limits the ability of state and local law enforcement officers to 
provide federal agents with information about the individuals in custody and subject to 
federal immigration custody or to transfer these individuals to federal immigration custody. 
Id. § 3. The provisions allow release of an individual or her information only if the United 
States provides a judicial warrant. Id. § 2. The United States characterized this law as 
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States, are preempted by federal law and impermissibly discriminate 
against the United States.269 In other words, by making it difficult for federal 
immigration officers to enforce federal immigration law, California is 
obstructing laws that “Congress has enacted . . . to take actions entrusted to 
it by the [U.S.] Constitution.”270 
Localities in California allied with the federal government’s 
enforcement vision will undoubtedly rely on the same forms of municipal 
empowerment that could benefit sanctuary cities and counties in anti-
sanctuary states like Texas. Despite the fact that California is home to the 
largest number of immigrants in the nation271 and has passed the most 
integrative set of laws at the state level, the negative sentiment against the 
state’s protection of immigrants endures in select cities and counties. 
Two prominent California counties, San Diego County272 and Orange 
County,273 have backed President Trump’s challenge to the State’s 
sanctuary laws. Similarly, the cities of Yorba Linda, Hesperia, Escondido, 
Aliso Viejo, Mission Viejo, Fountain Valley, and Barstow have filed briefs 
in support of the federal government.274 In this regard, these localities 
are following the oft-used tactic of aligning themselves with the federal 
government in raising preemption challenges against their state—
mirroring what localities did in contesting California’s Proposition 187 in 
1994 and Arizona’s S.B. 1070 in 2010.275 Thus far, however, the federal 
government challenge has not had much success. Ruling on the federal 
government’s motion for preliminary injunction, a California district 
court has mostly rejected the federal government’s argument that the 
                                                                                                                           
creating “difficult and dangerous efforts to re-arrest aliens who were previously in state 
custody, endangering immigration officers, the alien at issue, and others.” California 
Complaint, supra note 24, at 2–3, 16. 
 269. See California Complaint, supra note 24, at 2. 
 270. Id. at 3. 
 271. Hans Johnson & Sergio Sanchez, Just the Facts: Immigrants in California, Pub. 
Pol’y Inst. of Cal. (May 2018), http://www.ppic.org/publication/immigrants-in-california/ 
[https://perma.cc/V8F8-HPX6]. In 2016, the U.S. Census Bureau found that 27% of 
California’s population are foreign-born persons. QuickFacts: California, U.S. Census Bureau, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/CA/POP645216#viewtop [https://perma.cc/ 
JZ5E-AU4K] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). 
 272. Jennifer McEntee, San Diego County Backs Trump Challenge to California ‘Sanctuary’ 
Law, Reuters (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-california/ 
san-diego-county-backs-trump-challenge-to-california-sanctuary-law-idUSKBN1HO2XE [https:// 
perma.cc/BY6B-GAT2]. 
 273. Jeff Daniels, Trump Throws His Support Behind Orange County in Its War 
Against the California Sanctuary Law, CNBC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/03/28/trump-throws-support-behind-orange-county-in-fight-against-california-sanctuary-
law.html [https://perma.cc/97KW-7GUP]. 
 274. Municipalities & Elected Officials Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief in 
Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, United States v. California, 314 F. 
Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 2:18-CV-00490-JAM-KJN); Municipalities & Elected 
Officials Amici Curiae Brief, California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (No. 2:18-CV-00490-JAM-KJN). 
 275. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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laws were preempted or violated the intergovernmental immunities 
doctrine.276 
Separately, however, the City of Huntington Beach filed a state 
constitutional challenge against S.B. 54 in state court.277 What makes this 
challenge interesting is that Huntington Beach’s claim most directly 
invokes the kind of localism arguments suggested in this Essay in the 
anti-sanctuary context. California is a home-rule state. In fact, it stands 
apart from other home-rule states in that it is one of the few that grants 
localities immunity from state legislative preemption on matters of 
municipal affairs (synonymous with local affairs).278 Accordingly, 
Huntington Beach argues that home rule provides it the authority to 
control its municipal affairs, direct its resources, and contract directly with 
the federal government. In addition, it claims that S.B. 54 impermissibly 
meddles with that authority when it directs what localities can and cannot 
do with their personnel, facilities, or funds.279 In short, Huntington 
Beach is raising a structural-integrity argument in its effort to free itself 
from state preemption, albeit in favor of immigration enforcement. As 
such, it seems clear that any argument we advance in favor of local 
discretion for cities, like El Cenizo, seeking to disentangle themselves 
from state-mandated cooperation with federal authorities will redound to 
the benefit of cities like Huntington Beach in their attempt to buck  
                                                                                                                           
 276. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 1086 (granting in part and denying in part a 
preliminary injunction). The court declined to preliminarily enjoin all the challenged 
provisions of S.B. 54 and A.B. 103, finding neither field nor obstacle preemption and 
ruling that the intergovernmental immunities doctrine was not violated. See id. at 1093, 
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 277. See Kartikay Mehrotra, Huntington Beach Sues California over Immigration 
Policy, Bloomberg (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-
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Law Review). 
 278. See Cal. Const. art. XI, § 5(a). 
 279. See, e.g., Mehrotra, supra note 277 (quoting a Huntington City attorney stating 
that “[t]he state can’t tell us what we can and cannot spend our money on” and asserting 
that “[t]he way that law is drafted is the definition of constitutional overreach in 
California” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Priscella Vega, State Not Backing Down 
After Huntington Beach Wins in Court Challenge to ‘Sanctuary’ Immigration Law, L.A. 
Times (Sept. 28, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/news/tn-dpt-me-hb-
sb54-folo-20180928-story.html [https://perma.cc/7KXY-75FV] (describing the city’s 
argument that “the law violates its local control as a charter city”). A superior court in 
California has since ruled in Huntington Beach’s favor, but the state is appealing the 
decision. See Order for Issuance of Peremptory Writ of Mandate, City of Huntington 
Beach v. State of California, 30-2018-00984280-CU-WM-CJC (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2018); 
Priscella Vega, State Files Notice of Appeal Against O.C. Judge’s Ruling Exempting 
Huntington Beach from ‘Sanctuary’ Law, L.A. Times (Nov. 10, 2018), https:// 
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-huntington-beach-sanctuary-20181110-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/K6TG-6CS2]. 
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state-mandated limitations on their ability to participate in federal 
enforcement efforts. 
For sanctuary advocates, Huntington Beach’s lawsuit illustrates the 
double-edged sword in turning to localism and advancing local-autonomy 
claims. On the one hand, if California state courts find that immigration 
enforcement is not a municipal affair, then S.B. 54 preempts local 
policies and mandates sanctuary throughout the entire state. But such a 
finding will likely hamper efforts by localities in other states to raise 
structural-integrity or other localism claims based on their home-rule 
powers over local or municipal affairs. Indeed, if participation in federal 
immigration enforcement is not a municipal affair at all, then home-rule 
localities may be denied even the basic authority to enact sanctuary 
policies altogether, even in the absence of state anti-sanctuary. 
On the other hand, a victory for Huntington Beach on the municipal 
affairs question may strengthen similar claims by localities in other states, 
either on the basis of home-rule immunity or other structural 
protections. But it might also undermine state sanctuary efforts in places 
like Illinois, where the state can preempt on matters of local government 
affairs only if it explicitly states its intent to override home-rule authority, 
which Illinois’s sanctuary law does not do.280 Of course, a California 
ruling does not bind other state courts. Moreover, home rule in 
California is particularly strong. But given the similar language concerning 
“local” and “municipal affairs,” it is likely that any interpretation of its 
scope in the context of home rule will be influential elsewhere. 
Now, it may be possible to argue that localism arguments in support 
of local sanctuary policies do not stand on the same footing as local anti-
sanctuary policies. After all, if the foundation of the localism argument 
that Huntington Beach is raising is premised on a city’s power over its 
own municipal affairs, it would appear that policies that separate 
localities from the federal immigration enforcement are more squarely 
within that sphere than is a policy that seeks to expand local entanglement 
with federal law enforcement. After all, a decade earlier, the central 
debate with respect to cities in immigration enforcement was whether 
they could participate at all, given the federal government’s plenary power 
over immigration. It is only recently that the question has turned to 
whether they can refuse to participate. 
                                                                                                                           
 280. See Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6. It is worth noting that if Illinois did explicitly express 
its intent to preempt home rule authority, that would also mean that Chicago’s 
“Welcoming Cities” ordinance would be preempted. While providing for sanctuary 
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(prohibiting enforcement of federal civil immigration laws), with Chi., Ill., Mun. Code of 
Chi. ch. 2-173-042 (2018) (allowing cooperation with federal immigration authorities in 
certain situations). This still raises the question of whether localities or states are in a 
better position to decide when and the degree to which local law enforcement should 
involve themselves in immigration enforcement activities. 
892 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:837 
But even assuming that some forms of state sanctuary legislation 
might be compromised by strengthening the hand of localities, it is not 
clear how detrimental this would be to the project of mitigating the 
federal hyperenforcement regime. Absent a statewide standard, the 
largest and most populous localities in the state—Los Angeles County, 
Santa Clara County, and San Francisco—still maintain local sanctuary 
policies that are just as, if not more, stringent than the statewide rule. 
Meanwhile, localities that oppose the S.B. 54 standards have already 
found ways to undermine key aspects of the law’s attempt to shield 
noncitizens from federal enforcement.281 Orange County and Contra 
Costa County, for example, began to publicize release dates for inmates 
in their custody on their website;282 by making that information public, 
they were able to circumvent S.B. 54’s prohibition on communicating 
certain information with federal immigration authorities. 
Again, this is not to downplay how much state sanctuary laws like 
those in California are important landmarks with substantive protections 
for noncitizens. Undoubtedly, California’s S.B. 54 and its suite of other 
integrationist measures are remarkable legislative achievements that 
provide more statewide protection for noncitizens than any other 
jurisdiction.283 And other states may follow suit. But given that the largest, 
most immigrant-heavy jurisdictions across the country are almost 
uniformly sanctuary jurisdictions, it is not clear that a weakened state 
ability to enact sanctuary legislation will necessarily be a worse outcome 
than weakening the ability of counties, sheriffs’ departments, police 
departments, and cities to enact integrationist policies. 
In the end, though, we acknowledge the difficulty that cases like the 
one involving Huntington Beach raise for immigration advocates. Like 
federalism, localism on its own has no “political valence.”284 In theory, at 
least, it may be used to support progressive or conservative policies—
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at 37–40) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing ways in which different 
localities have implemented the state law). 
 282. Id. (manuscript at 31); see also Roxana Kopetman, In Response to California 
Sanctuary Law, Orange County Sheriff Makes Public Inmates’ Release Dates, Orange 
County Reg. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/26/in-response-to-
california-sanctuary-law-orange-county-sheriff-makes-public-inmates-release-dates/ [https:// 
perma.cc/78GL-JF82]. 
 283. See, e.g., S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The California Package: 
Immigrant Integration and the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, Pol’y Matters, Spring 
2015, at 1, 1–2 (arguing that the “California package” of integration laws protecting 
unauthorized immigrants “goes well beyond any benefits imagined in federal proposals on 
immigration reform”); Karthick Ramakrishnan, Opinion, Look to California’s Model, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/09/03/is-immigration- 
really-a-problem-in-the-us/look-to-californias-model (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing benefits given to undocumented immigrants in California). 
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sanctuary and anti-sanctuary alike. But that also means that there is no 
neutral position; eschewing localism or local-autonomy arguments has 
just as much of an effect on substantive policies like sanctuary and anti-
sanctuary as embracing them. 
On balance, given the degree to which sanctuary historically has been, 
and continues to be, spearheaded by local governments, greater local 
autonomy will promote rather than impede efforts to develop a more 
effective and humane immigration enforcement system. Even putting 
substantive policy outcomes aside, it may be that normative claims about 
localism and the local political process, some of which are outlined in 
this Essay, make greater local autonomy worthwhile. One thing is clear, 
though: It is no longer possible to ignore localism in how we think about 
immigration and immigration enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The battlegrounds for the nationwide fight over sanctuary cities are 
shifting. As federal efforts to coerce participation in immigration 
enforcement efforts have floundered, state legislatures have taken up the 
call. The state anti-sanctuary laws that have been proposed or passed 
threaten to quash local dissent on immigration enforcement policy more 
effectively than their federal counterparts. In turn, those interested in 
preserving local discretion to resist complicity and conscription into the 
federal immigration enforcement scheme must also embrace new legal 
and theoretical frameworks. 
This Essay suggests that immigration advocates and commentators will 
benefit from embracing municipal authority in immigration enforcement 
law. The emerging anti-sanctuary trend, typified by punitive and draconian 
provisions, provides a ripe opportunity to test the limits of state control 
over local discretion. More broadly, recognizing municipal control over 
sanctuary policies is a recognition of the local nature of national 
immigration policies and, simultaneously, a recognition of the national 
implications of local policymaking. A localist lens broadens our 
understanding of where and how critical immigration enforcement 
governance decisions are made and provides the legal and theoretical 
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